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A primary objective of the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project is to 
provide an example of high assurance development that will be available worldwide.  In 
addition, geographically distributed project collaborators and evaluators need access to 
releasable project artifacts.  Thus, a means of online dissemination is required.  While 
other open source projects make available their project material on unrestricted websites, 
the TCX project requires a more controlled dissemination environment.  Specifically, all 
TCX project materials will have access control markings and their dissemination will be 
regulated based on those markings.  The dissemination system used by the TCX project 
will need to provide strictly controlled web distributions with configurable access control 
to different portions of the project results.   
A. OVERVIEW OF TCX PROJECT  
The goal of the TCX project is to provide an openly distributed worked example 
of how high assurance trusted computing components can be built [1].  The majority of 
developers today are not focusing on creating high assurance products, mainly due to lack 
of training and the early-to-market push.  The TCX project was created to show future 
developers how to apply high assurance development methodology to the construction of 
products that can be evaluated against the highest evaluation assurance level defined by 
the Common Criteria [2].  
High assurance trusted computing addresses the problems of frontal attacks and 
subversion.  It encompasses the science and engineering required to specify, design, 
implement, and maintain components which have a high level of confidence against both 
frontal attacks and system subversion [1].  Systems must meet not only sound security 
criteria, but also be built in such a way that it is possible to verify the protection 
mechanisms provided. 
The TCX project includes four related activities to spread the knowledge of high 
assurance development [3]. These four activities are: 
• Creation of a reusable high assurance development framework 
• Development of a reference-implementation trusted network component 
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• Support for evaluation of the reference component against the highest 
assurance criteria as defined in the Common Criteria (EAL7) 
• Open dissemination of the results of the first three activities 
The reusable development framework and open dissemination objectives establish 
a set of conditions that the design of the TCX dissemination system must address. 
1. Reusable Development Framework 
The development framework is made up of a high assurance life cycle framework 
and a high assurance rapid development environment.  The life cycle framework utilized 
is the spiral life cycle model with additional high assurance properties required by the 
EAL7 life cycle requirements [3].  The additional life cycle requirements include 
rigorous configuration management and strict developmental security safeguards [3].  
The rapid development environment consists of a documentation integration environment 
(DIE) used to construct and manage the TCX project documents; development tools and 
procedures for construction of TCX software; and verification tools and procedures with 
which to determine with high assurance whether the system that is built is as was defined 
[3].  The DIE specifies the use of XML for authoring the project documents.  XML 
allows greater document control and paves the way for fine grained access control during 
dissemination. 
2. Open Dissemination 
The open dissemination requirements for the TCX project include mechanisms for 
continuous contribution, evaluation and distribution of various project configuration 
items and deliverables [1].  Currently the TCX project has no mechanisms in place to 
fulfill these requirements or to openly distribute project outputs.   
B. OVERVIEW OF TCX DISSEMINATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The TCX Dissemination System is required to disseminate project material over 
the Internet.  To satisfy the open dissemination requirement, the Dissemination System 
must be web-based.  The Dissemination System must be able to disseminate XML 
documents, source code, and various other file formats with integrity and confidentiality 
protection.  Additionally, the Dissemination System must provide group-based access 
control for different areas of the online site.  Common Criteria high assurance trusted 
delivery requirements must also be addressed by the TCX Dissemination System.   
3 
C. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of study is to determine the best way to build a dissemination system 
that satisfies the TCX dissemination requirements.  First an analysis of existing 
dissemination systems is conducted.  Based on the results of this analysis, a design for the 
initial implementation of an XML-centric web-based dissemination system is proposed.  
This design will include a threat analysis of the proposed system, development of the 
system requirements, and generation of a high level design specification.  The design 
specification is used to implement an initial prototype.  The result of this thesis is a 
useable dissemination prototype for the TCX project that mostly satisfies the TCX 
dissemination requirements.  The lessons learned from this effort provide crucial insight 
for future refinement of the prototype. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER 
This thesis contains eight chapters and one appendix.  Chapter I describes the 
need for the design and implementation of the TCX Dissemination System.  Chapter II 
provides background material on existing dissemination systems, Common Criteria 
requirements, Apache web server, and XML tags.  Chapter III contains the requirements 
analysis including the high level design and concept of operation for the Dissemination 
System and Application.  Additionally, it contains the assumptions, policies, threats and 
security objectives for the Dissemination System and its environment.  Chapter IV 
provides a detailed description of the system requirements and the rationale mapping of 
the assumptions, threats, policies, and security objectives that created them.  Chapter V 
contains an overview of the system design and a detailed high level functional design 
specification.  Chapter VI describes the initial prototype design to implement the 
Dissemination System.  Finally, Chapter VII contains future work and conclusions.  
Appendix A contains configuration files from the initial implementation while Appendix 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The background information contained herein is described in four separate 
sections.  The first section contains a survey of existing dissemination systems to 
determine whether a new dissemination system must be created or if an existing one 
would be suitable.  The next section addresses the Common Criteria trusted delivery 
requirements.  This section first reviews the trusted distribution requirements from the 
TCSEC and then the trusted delivery requirements from the Separation Kernel Protection 
Profile, which is based on the Common Criteria.  The third section discusses the 
usefulness of the Apache Web Server and its security services.  The last section provides 
an overview of XML and some of its potential uses within the TCX project. 
A. SURVEY OF EXISTING DISSEMINATION SYSTEMS 
1. Introduction 
Before developing the Dissemination System for the TCX project, a survey of 
existing online dissemination systems was conducted.  This was done for two reasons: 
first, if a system exists that fulfills the needs for the TCX project dissemination, then 
there is no need to create a new one, and second, other dissemination systems might 
provide guidance and lessons learned that might be applied to the development of the 
TCX Dissemination System. 
To guide the survey, specific requirements for the TCX project must be identified.  
First, the Dissemination System must be able to support multiple user groups because the 
developers realized that certain information should only be provided to specific users.  
Second, since the project will be evaluated for an EAL7 certification, evaluation and 
validation evidence must be available.  Furthermore, most documentation for the TCX 
project is written in XML.  The Dissemination System must therefore be able to 
distribute XML documents, in addition to the TCX kernel software, and other non-XML 
material.  These requirements were all taken into account while analyzing other online 
dissemination systems.  This survey examined dissemination techniques implemented by 
university projects and selected open source projects available online.  Specifically, 




The first university project examined was the Extremely Reliable Operating 
System or EROS-OS.  All project material examined can be found online and the 
information here came from the EROS-OS website [4].  The project was originally 
implemented at the University of Pennsylvania, but was later moved to Johns Hopkins 
University.  The primary goal of this project is to create a small, secure, real-time 
operating system.  The documentation available for this project was limited, and the 
background information was not relevant to this study.  Warning banners displayed that 
documents might not reflect the actual implementation and most data available were draft 
versions of documents.  All documentation available online had no form of integrity 
verification.  The site had no restricted sections, therefore no identification and 
authentication methods were employed.  The EROS-OS team seemed to communicate 
solely via mailing lists.  There are multiple mailing lists and some required that the 
members of the list be part of the development team. 
To obtain the actual project files and the kernel, a user must use the OpenCM 
repository [4].  OpenCM is a free program that the user must download and install on his 
or her own system before using.  To use OpenCM with the project, the user also has to 
install the anonymous access key for non-developers.  This complex installation of 
programs would not be efficient for the TCX project. 
3. Fiasco Microkernel 
The next project examined was the Fiasco Microkernel developed by the Dresden 
University of Technology.  This dissemination system was difficult to navigate but can be 
found online [5].  There was limited documentation found on the website, and much of it 
seemed incomplete.  These documents were available for download in an Adobe Acrobat 
format.  Again, the project used mailing lists for project discussion, but the mailing lists 
seemed unrestricted.  To receive the project kernel the user must connect through a 
remote CVS system.  Once the tar archive is downloaded, additional modules are needed 
for use of the project.  The tar archive also had an MD5 checksum so the user can check 
the integrity of the file downloaded.  While this project did have additional integrity 
protection in the form of MD5 checksums, it did not provide the access controls 
necessary for the TCX project. 
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4. Apache Web Server  
The Apache Web Server is one of the most used web servers on the Internet; and 
thus it should have an effective method of dissemination.  The Apache Web Server is 
available online and is already prepackaged with many Linux distributions [6].  The 
website offered extensive documentation in the form of HTML documents without 
integrity verification.  All of the documentation was publicly accessible.  There were tar 
archive downloads available for installing Apache on most operating systems.  Also, 
integrity checks were available for the downloaded tar archive as either PGP or MD5 
checksums.  The Apache group also had multiple mailing lists for different groups of 
users of the system.  While the Apache project’s dissemination scheme could satisfy 
some of the TCX project dissemination goals, it does not have document integrity which 
is essential to the TCX project validation process. 
5. OpenBSD 
OpenBSD is a free UNIX-like operating system available online [7].  The online 
documentation is available in the form of man pages.  Additionally, there is a daily 
change log online that tracks all changes made to the system.  This feature provides 
thorough feedback that can otherwise be hard to track by viewers of the project.  Group 
mailing lists were also accessible online.   
The online site offered project material from multiple CVS servers in addition to 
FTP and CD sets; however, the anonCVS server is stated as the preferred method of 
downloading the project.  When the user accesses the CVS server it updates the local 
copy of the software with changes made to the current OpenBSD sources.  While this is 
an effective way to assure that the user has the most up-to-date version, it would not be 
necessary for the TCX project.  Furthermore, the user cannot simply download a tar 
archive of the project from the website, and instead requires the CVS interface to receive 
all files easily.  CVS does offer an encrypted channel for transmission, but there is no 
mention of integrity checking of the documents available for download. 
6. Other Projects and Conclusions 
Other surveyed projects were the OpenSSL Project and the Linux Kernel.  These 
projects provided no additional methods compared to the previous projects discussed.  
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They utilized similar distribution options and mailing lists and neither had any unique 
methods. 
None of the projects surveyed completely fulfilled the initial goals of the TCX 
Dissemination System.  Specifically, the TCX Dissemination System must implement 
group-based access controls and be capable of processing XML documents.  
Furthermore, the TCX project does not utilize the CVS interface which was widely used 
by other projects.  A completely new system must be developed to meet the TCX project 
goals for proper dissemination of project material.   
B. COMMON CRITERIA TRUSTED DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS 
Since the TCX project will be evaluated against the Common Criteria, it needs to 
meet certain delivery requirements.  These requirements were first specified in the 
Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) in 1985 for the Class A1 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [8].  The TCSEC was written and maintained by the 
Department of Defense and was the precursor to the Common Criteria.  It provided a 
metric for evaluating the effectiveness of security controls built into computer systems.  
The Common Criteria is the newer, internationally accepted metric used today.  The 
TCSEC trusted distribution requirements will be discussed first, followed by the trusted 
delivery requirements as written in the Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [9]. 
1. Trusted Distribution from the TCSEC 
Trusted Distribution as specified by the TCSEC has two parts.  First, the TCSEC 
states that there must be an automatic control system and distribution facility to maintain 
the integrity between the master data describing the current version of the system and the 
on-site master copy for the code of the current version [8].  While this wording is not 
extremely clear it is explained in the Guide to Understanding Trusted Delivery: “all of 
the distribution material must arrive to a customer site exactly as intended by the vendor 
without any alterations” [10].  This guarantees that the onsite version must match the 
master copy.   
The second part requires that, there must be procedures to assure that all updates 
distributed to a customer are exactly the same as the master version [8].  While this might 
seem more straightforward, the word “procedures” is never specified.  In some cases this 
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can be an external signature verification tool or a form of encryption.  But whatever the 
procedures are they must exist to ensure that the master and customer version match.   
Trusted Distribution protects the TCB from two main threats.  The first threat is 
someone tampering with the TCB during its movement.  The second threat protects 
against the distribution of a counterfeit system [10].  These two threats exist for any 
distributed system and thus these high assurance requirements have not changed 
significantly over the years.   
2. Trusted Delivery from SKPP 
The Separation Kernel Protection Profile is written to describe the requirements 
for a class of high assurance kernels.  The TCX Separation Kernel is required to conform 
to the SKPP and thus the SKPP requirements for trusted delivery must be supported by 
the TCX Dissemination System.  In the Common Criteria paradigm, the system that is the 
subject of evaluation is referred to as a Target of Evaluation (TOE). 
 The procedures outlined in the SKPP are for both the initial distribution and 
subsequent updates to the TOE and its components.  Similar to the first requirement from 
the TCSEC, the on-site version of the TOE must match the master distribution version. 
Additionally, the SKPP requires that the TOE include procedures and/or tools to verify 
that the on-site version of the TOE matches the master version [9].  Whereas the TCSEC 
specifies that a tool must be used to verify the integrity of the system, the SKPP explicitly 
requires the tool to be part of the evaluation.  It states, “such a verification tool may be 
configured to execute on the TOE (but not as part of the TSF) or on other hardware, but 
in either case the tool and the hardware that it runs on are evaluated as part of the TOE” 
[9].  The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the TOE and its components must 
be delivered to the customer environment securely.  This results in the user having a 
complete and verified TOE.  If the TOE or any of its components are modified after 
delivery or if the TOE is incomplete it will not be in an evaluated configuration [9].   
The SKPP meets the requirements for trusted delivery by requiring cryptographic 
signature services and hashing functions to protect the integrity of the TOE when 
distributing versions of the TOE to the user site.  Additionally, independent channels 
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must be used to deliver both the TOE and the cryptographic keying materials used to 
verify the TOE distribution [9].   
While the TCSEC sets the standards for trusted distribution, the SKPP helps to 
clarify and give specifics as to the requirements for trusted delivery.  The SKPP builds 
upon the infrastructure created by the TCSEC. 
C. APACHE SECURITY SERVICES 
1. Why Apache? 
The Apache Web Server was chosen to host the TCX Dissemination System 
website for three reasons: 1) it is free, 2) it is the most used web server on the Internet, 
and 3) it provides a variety of security services.  The security services that provide the 
robustness of the web server are audit logging, authentication, and module add-ons, 
particularly OpenSSL [6].  Each of these services will be discussed in the subsequent 
sections. 
2. Audit Logging 
Apache provides extensive logging options for the website.  The logging options 
allow easy auditing of both access to the site and errors encountered with website 
operation.  These configurable audit functions provide all foreseeable auditing necessary 
for the TCX project.  The lowest level of audit logging will record every action, from 
opening and reading the configuration file to user interaction with the site.  This level of 
logging, called the debug level, provides the most detailed logs possible on the Apache 
system without the implementation of third party logging mechanism.  The flexibility of 
the Apache audit functionality allows support of different audit policies as may be 
defined by the TCX project management. 
3. Authentication 
Apache also provides online authentication methods.  While the login prompt 
varies slightly based on the web browser being used, it provides a common window 
where the user enters his or her user name and password.  The window also contains a 
configurable message from the web server. 
Apache configuration files can specify a single user to have access to a website.  
Additionally, Apache allows groups of users to be configured with group-specific access 
to web content.  The TCX project will take full advantage of this functionality to 
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implement group-based access controls.  Additionally, the Apache server also hashes the 
user password in the password file.  This is a beneficial security feature because the 
system administrator will never see the user passwords.  The Apache configuration places 
file authentication requirements in the website configuration file.  The password file is a 
separate file that contains the username and the corresponding password hash.  The group 
file contains the group and the users assigned to the group.  Apache allows this as the 
basic configuration in which all information is sent in the clear.  While this might seem 
like a security vulnerability, the OpenSSL module can mitigate this. 
4. Add-on Modules and OpenSSL 
Apache allows additional modules to be configured for added functionality.  One 
of the most useful modules is the OpenSSL module.  SSL is the Secure Sockets Layer 
protocol and it operates with HTTP as a service called HTTPS.  While HTTP operates on 
port 80, HTTPS operates on port 443.  With SSL, a digital certificate signed by a trusted 
third party can be used by the web server to authenticate itself to the user.  Once this 
authentication is established an encrypted channel is created between the web server and 
the user.  At this point information can be sent in the clear because it travels through the 
encrypted channel.  SSL also provides logging functionality similar to that of the Apache 
web server.  This includes the logging of SSL errors and SSL accesses to the web site. 
5. Apache Conclusion 
Apache is an excellent choice for disseminating TCX project material because of 
both the functional and security services it provides.  The audit logging will be sufficient 
to track website access and error logging for both SSL and non-SSL connections.  The 
authentication methods allow for configurable individual or group access to web pages.  
Add-on modules provide additional functionalities that can be tailored to specific server 
needs.  In particular, SSL provides the security for both site authentication and encrypted 
channels necessary for secure dissemination. 
D. XML TAG OVERVIEW 
1. XML Background 
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a text and data-formatting language 
that has a tag-based syntax similar to the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) [11].  An 
XML tag is delineated in a document by angled brackets.  A start and end tag are required 
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for proper processing with the end tag containing a forward slash.  All data between the 
start and end tag take the properties that the tags specify.  Tags can be arbitrarily nested 
lending a natural tree structure to XML documents.  XML prescribes text styles but also 
defines data types for cross platform communication.  XML documents contain only data, 
so applications that process XML documents must decide how to display the data based 
on the embedded tags.   
2. Why XML? 
To provide traceability between specification and implementation, the TCX 
project requires most TCX documentation to be written in XML.  There were a variety of 
reasons as to why XML was the best choice.  First of all, XML provides a standards-
compliant data format.  XML has a semi-formally defined structure that can be used to 
express the structure of documents.  XML provides easy methods to publish documents 
online in addition to providing different presentation modes for the same document.  
Unlike most documents created by word processors, XML offers fine-grained document 
control allowing each element to be signed rather than solely signing the entire document.  
While XML can be written to look like a normal text document, it has the added feature 
in that it can provide meaning to the information with embedded tags.  XML documents 
can also easily be ported to any platform and maintain their well-formed structure.  
Finally, XML can separate content from presentation.  This allows the authors to focus on 
content rather than project formatting standards.  XML provides a variety of features over 
common word processor programs and thus was chosen to create the TCX 
documentation.  
3. Document Creation 
XML has preset tag libraries that create an XML instance language.  The TCX 
project documentation is created using the DocBook instance language.  DocBook was 
chosen because it is, “particularly well suited to books and papers about computer 
hardware and software” [11].  However, XML will also be used to create access control 
tags for the documents.  These user-defined tags change the instance language of the 
document because the user defined tags are not recognized by DocBook. 
4. XSL Transformations 
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XSL is a style sheet language for XML that is commonly used to translate XML 
documents to HTML documents.  This will be utilized in the TCX project so that 
documentation can be displayed online in a common web browser.  In addition to using 
the standard XSL transformations for DocBook, user-defined tags must be specified as to 
how they will be display in HTML.  This additional configuration will allow TCX project 
material to be displayed exactly as the authors intended. 
E. SUMMARY 
After the survey of existing dissemination systems was presented, the need for a 
new TCX-specific dissemination system was established and the requirements for trusted 
delivery according to the Common Criteria were described.  The benefits of the Apache 
Web Server and XML with respect to the TCX project were also explained.  In the next 
















































III. TCX DISSEMINATION REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
This chapter contains the high level description of the Dissemination System 
including its purpose, concept of operation, conceptual architecture, system access, and 
XML document handling.  Using the Common Criteria methodology, the threat analysis 
for the Dissemination System is discussed in terms of environmental assumptions, 
anticipated threats, organizational security policies and security objectives.  An overview 
of the system requirements for secure delivery and dissemination of material is presented 
last. 
A. HIGH LEVEL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
1. Purpose of TCX Dissemination System 
Information from the TCX project will be disseminated across the Internet.  
Dissemination material will include source code, design specifications, evaluation 
evidence, user guidance, administrative guidance, and binaries.  Trusted delivery 
requirements must be met for both the dissemination of the TCX kernel and the other 
dissemination material according to the Separation Kernel Protection Profile [9].  The 
users will have the material via trusted delivery with a guarantee of the integrity of the 
source and version.  Validators require trusted delivery in order to validate the product.   
For the other dissemination ideas discussed previously, the distribution of data in 
a large zipped file or tar archive via email could be a potential delivery mechanism.  This 
Dissemination System must support multiple groups of users with varying access levels 
to the data.  Because of this, a single tar archive distribution of the material would not be 
suitable for all data.  The Dissemination System must be able to distribute both tar 
archives and individual files to which specific access controls apply.  The different users 
who will have access to the information include: administrators, collaborators, customers, 
developers, evaluators, NIST/NSA validators, and the general public. 
2. Dissemination Environment Concept of Operation 
a. Internal Data Flow 
Before data can be accessed by users, it must first be installed on the 
Dissemination System.  The flow of information is displayed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Dissemination Environment Data Flow 
First, (step 1) labeled documents or data are submitted to Configuration 
Management by the developers.  There they are entered into the Configuration 
Management System and signed by the Configuration Manager.  Next, (step 2) a 
dissemination policy database containing release policies for the dissemination material 
and who can view them is generated by the TCX Configuration Control Board and 
submitted to Configuration Management.  Third, (step 3) the project manager generates a 
Releasable Items List database (RIL) that itemizes which documents may be released by 
the Dissemination System.  That list is then passed to the Releasing Agent (step 4).  The 
Releasing Agent uses the RIL to request documents from Configuration Management 
(step 5).  In addition, the Releasing Agent obtains the dissemination policy database from 
Configuration Management (step 5).  In step 6 the Releasing Agent exports all releasable 
material, the RIL, and the policy database to the Dissemination System.  After receiving 
the RIL, the Dissemination Application performs a sweep of the dissemination material 
repository to assure that all data it controls is releasable in accordance with the current 
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RIL.  If an item is revoked or becomes non-releasable it is moved to a non-releasable 
items folder on the system.  This imposes an additional access control mechanism on the 
data.  The Dissemination System can now perform access control on the releasable 
material based on the current policy and the access control markings or document 
descriptor files contained within the data.  This generates the webpage repository, 
through which the user accesses the dissemination material.  In step 7 the CISR 
Certificate Authority exports the signed Dissemination System digital certificate.  Finally, 
in step 8 the user database (described in the next section) is transferred to the 
Dissemination System.  All externally-generated data (steps six through eight) are 
transferred to the Dissemination System via secure means.  At this point, the 
Dissemination System has all data necessary to properly disseminate project material to 
appropriate users when requested. 
b. User Access Flow 
Figure 2 shows the user access flow.  Unnumbered steps have been 
described previously.  There are two types of users: public users and registered users.  
Public users can only access non-proprietary project material.  In order to retrieve 
proprietary project material, users must first register with the CISR Web Server to obtain 
a unique user name and password before accessing data (step 1).  Once registration is 
complete and the user is authorized as a valid user of the system, the user database will be 
updated and exported to the Dissemination System (step 2).  Additionally, any user 
groups the user belongs to will be assigned prior to export based on specific information 
about the user.  Users will not be able to gain access to the Dissemination System through 
the CISR Web Server.  The CISR Web Server will also provide a feedback mechanism 
for the users of the system.  The feedback will be processed externally from the 
Dissemination System within the Dissemination Environment. 
Finally, step 3 allows the user to access data on the Dissemination System.  
The Dissemination Application will produce views for users to download the data by 
processing the policy and releasable items list.  These views will not be kept under the 
Configuration Management system. 
 
Figure 2.   User Data Access on Dissemination System 
3. Dissemination System Conceptual Architecture 
The Dissemination System is comprised of the operating system, a web server, the 
Dissemination Application and supporting tools.  When data has been approved for 
release, it will be manually exported from TCX Configuration Management to the 
Releasing Agent.  Then the Releasing Agent will provide the data via secure means to the 
Dissemination System Administrator who will import it onto the Dissemination System.   
The Dissemination Application (DA), located on the Dissemination System, will 
maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the dissemination data.  The DA is 
responsible for webpage management on the system.  Access control markings on 
documents will be used by the DA to generate the webpage repository.  Users will be 
able to download or view dissemination material through a standard web browser.  This 




The Dissemination Application will process multiple databases in order to 
perform its task of properly disseminating data.  First, it will have the TCX project 
dissemination material.  Additionally, it will have control of the Releasable Items List 
and the Dissemination Policy database which are both used to determine what to 
disseminate and to whom. 
4. System Access Control Policy 
Access to information stored on the Dissemination System will be based on the 
group to which the user belongs.  Because not all users should have access to all the 
information on the system, group-based access control is used.  Administrators will be 
able to access all documents necessary for the performance of their jobs.  The internal 
TCX developers will have read access to specific data on the system.  Members of the 
group that created the documents to be disseminated will have read access to documents 
they have created.  The evaluators will have read access to official documents and data, 
whereas the collaborators will have read access to engineering releases and jointly-
developed documents.  The NIST/NSA validators will have sufficient access to 
evaluation evidence, documents, and code necessary for validating the system evaluation.  
The customers will only have access to documents that are deemed appropriate per their 
use licenses.  The general public will have the most restricted access to data.   
Access control lists will be used to regulate the data available to different groups.  
Login with a user name and password will be required to access all non-proprietary 
material.  Access to public documents will not require system registration.  Configurable 
audit functions will allow for auditing of user identification, accesses, and other events.  
The Dissemination System will distribute to users digitally signed versions of unaltered, 
releasable documents.  For specific users, an external signature verification tool will be 
provided to ensure the integrity of data.  However, this tool will not be distributed 
through the Dissemination System. The system will also distribute the official documents 
to the validators.  These official documents will be signed by the Configuration Manager 
so that document recipients can verify the version and source of the material.  Once 
validated, this signed version will be releasable to specified user groups via the 
Dissemination System along with other releasable documents.   
5. Document Creation and Viewing 
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Prior to entering configuration management, documents will be created using 
XML.  When documents cannot be created using XML, for example source code and 
binaries, then XML document descriptor files will be implemented.  This is because non-
XML documents cannot have in-line tags with which access control is performed.  
Versions of documents will be submitted to the Configuration Manager following the 
standard procedures for the TCX project.  Upon release, they will be exported from the 
configuration management system to the Dissemination System via the Releasing Agent.  
The documents will include XML tags that specify the user groups allowed to view them.  
In the case of non-XML data, the document descriptor file will be an XML document 
with access control tags referring to a specific non-XML file.  Document descriptor files 
will contain tags for all material in one Configuration Item (CI).  The CI is the smallest 
item submitted to Configuration Management for the TCX project.  A CI may contain 
multiple files or be a single file.  In both cases, these tags will be bound to all data in 
order to determine appropriate access levels of users.  The tag granularity will be 
arbitrary but the initial implementation of the Dissemination System will only use 
document level tags for access control.  These access control lists will assure the proper 
dissemination of data to users.  The Dissemination System will adhere to the distribution 
standards of the XML document tags.  Viewing of the XML documents via the Internet 
will be made possible by XSL transformations.  The Dissemination System will 
implement transformations of XML documents to allow client access. 
B. THREAT ANALYSIS 
1. Background 
A threat analysis must consider the assumptions about the system and its 
environment, the threats to the system, and the organizational security policies that exist 
in the target environment.  The assumptions are a means to narrow the threats and focus 
solely on the system being evaluated.  All three elements of the threat analysis are created 
in order to develop a threat model from which requirements can be derived.  Threats to 
the Dissemination System were based on the threats to a standard web server combined 
with the additional threats resulting from the sensitivity of the information being 
transmitted.  Many of the policies, assumptions, and threats listed below were adapted 
from the Web Server Protection Profile to fit the TCX dissemination framework [12].  
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Additionally, the high assurance requirements of the TCX project account for additional 
threats that would not exist in a low assurance environment.  However, before the threats 
can be considered, assumptions regarding the system must be made.  In the context of 
this work, IT Environment describes the underlying hardware and software upon which 
the Dissemination System runs.  The Dissemination Environment is the Dissemination 
System and all of the entities described in Figures 1 and 2.    
2. Assumptions 
Assumptions for the system allow the threats to be narrowed.  Table 1 
summarizes the conditions that are assumed to exist in the IT Environment and 
Dissemination Environment. 
The physical protection of the system, A.PHYSICAL, secures the system from 
malicious physical attacks.  The physical security measures are assumed to be 
commensurate with the physical value of the data such that they will help mitigate attacks 
to the physical system. 
A.INTERNAL_PROCESSING The internal implementation and execution of the 
Dissemination System’s underlying operating system, 
web server, and cryptographic libraries run as expected. 
A.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN All administrative functions will be performed with 
access to the physical computer. 
A.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained 
and follow all administrator guidance. 
A.PHYSICAL The Dissemination Environment will provide physical 
security commensurate with the value of the data being 
served by the Dissemination System. 
Table 1. System Assumptions 
Since the administrators effectively have complete control over the system, they 
are assumed to be non-hostile and trained as described by A.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN.  
Additionally, when performing administrative tasks, the administrator must be in physical 
contact with the computer.  No remote administration will be performed on the system as 
described in A.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN. 
Finally, the underlying operating system, web server, and cryptographic libraries 
are assumed to operate correctly.  According to A.INTERNAL_PROCESSING, the flow 
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of data inside the dissemination operating system, web server, and cryptographic libraries 
will be correct, and the implementation of this software is not flawed.  System calls to the 
operating system will not result in incorrect Dissemination System behavior.  
Additionally, user interaction with the web server will operate as expected with respect to 
uniform resource locators (URLs), web content, and vulnerabilities against network 
protocols (e.g. HTTP, TCP, IP).  The cryptographic libraries will properly handle the 
cryptographic functions and key management. 
These assumptions help to mitigate some of the threats to the system.  However, 
there are still many threats that must be taken into account with the development of the 
Dissemination System. 
3. Threats 
While the threats are listed below in table format, the most relevant threat to the 
Dissemination System is T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS.  Based on the high assurance 
nature of the TCX project and the information being disseminated, unauthorized access is 
the primary concern for the system.  The Dissemination System must be able to securely 
deliver dissemination material to authorized users of the system.  Thus the threat of 
T.ALTERED_DATA must be mitigated by the design.  Additionally, 
T.SYSTEM_COMPROMISE must be mitigated to assure that the data and code of the 
dissemination system is not inappropriately accessed resulting in the improper 
dissemination of data to users.   
T.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERROR The administrator may incorrectly install or 
configure the Dissemination System which could 
lead to additional threats and vulnerabilities. 
T.ACCIDENTAL_AUDIT_ 
COMPROMISE 
A user may accidentally view, modify or delete 
audit records resulting in a user’s actions to be 
masked. 
T.ALTERED_DATA The end user version of dissemination data may 
differ from the master version of the releasable 
data maintained by the Dissemination System 
thus resulting in corrupted delivery. 
T.MASQUERADE A foreign entity may masquerade as the 
Dissemination System resulting in 
misrepresentation of the Dissemination System’s 
controlled dissemination data. 
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T.POOR_DESIGN Unintentional errors in the requirements 
specification or design of the Dissemination 
Application may occur, leading to flaws that may 
be exploited by a casually mischievous user or 
program. 
T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION Unintentional errors in implementation of the 
Dissemination Application design may occur, 
leading to flaws that may be exploited by a 
casually mischievous user or program. 
T.POOR_TEST Lack of or insufficient tests of the Dissemination 
Application to demonstrate that all security 
functions operate correctly may result in incorrect 
behavior being undiscovered thereby causing 
potential security vulnerabilities. 
T.ROGUE_ENTITY The Dissemination Environment entities, other 
than the Dissemination System, may not be 
trustworthy thus resulting in the improper 
dissemination of data. 
T.SYSTEM_COMPROMISE The Dissemination System data and/or code may 
be inappropriately accessed resulting in the 
improper dissemination of data to users. 
T.UNATTENDED_SESSION A user may gain unauthorized access to an 
unattended administrator session. 
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain access to dissemination data for 
which the user is not authorized according to the 
access control attributes of the data. 
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS The administrator may not have the ability to 
notice potential security violations, thus limiting 
the administrator’s ability to identify and take 
action against a possible security breach. 
Table 2. System Threats 
The administrator threat of T.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERROR is the fourth 
greatest risk to the Dissemination System.  The incorrect installation of the system may 
include incorrect access control lists on files or incorrect installation or configuring of the 
Dissemination System processes.  This threat can lead to other threats already stated.  The 
administrator must also prevent users gaining access to unattended administrator 
sessions.  This threat, T.UNATTENDED_SESSION could result in a malicious user 
corrupting the entire system.  The administrator must also be aware of the threat of 
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T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS and realize that some user activity could possibly be 
hidden.  
While auditing will be performed on the system to enhance the security, this adds 
the threat of T.ACCIDENTAL_AUDIT_COMPROMISE.  Viewing, modifying, or 
deleting of the audit records by clients or processes could cause a user’s actions to be 
masked or not recorded.  This would create an unwanted circumstance that could be 
potentially threatening to the system. 
The Dissemination Environment consists of multiple entities that provide 
technical measures and information necessary for secure dissemination of material.  If 
these entities are not trustworthy then the improper dissemination of data to users could 
result (T.ROGUE_ENTITY). 
The threat of a foreign entity masquerading as the Dissemination System may 
result in the misrepresentation of the Dissemination System’s controlled dissemination 
data as described by T.MASQUERADE. 
T.POOR_DESIGN, T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION, and T.POOR_TEST are all 
relevant threats to a newly developed system.  If the design or implementation is 
incomplete or poorly done, then potential threats become a reality on the system.  
Additionally, poor testing of the system once implemented can leave security 
vulnerabilities on the system. 
The requirements specification for the Dissemination System will address the 
threats to mitigate the risks posed by the threats discussed above.  But first, policies 
regarding system use must be articulated.  This will help to identify which threats are 
valid and which should never occur on the system. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES 
The policies applied to the system set the limits for system use.  They define the 
acceptable use of the system.  Mainly, they are security policies for the system and thus 
help to maintain the assurance of the data. 
P.ACCESS_BANNER The Dissemination System will present a banner to all users 
describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other 
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appropriate information to which users consent by accessing 
the system. 
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The authorized users of the system shall be held accountable 
for their actions on the system. 
P.DATA_MARKING All dissemination data will be properly marked with access 
control attributes. 
Table 3. Security Policies 
Users must realize who controls the system and the acceptable activities allowed 
on the system.  Additionally, they must understand that they are held responsible for their 
actions while using the system.  Therefore the policies of P.ACCESS_BANNER and 
P.ACCOUNTABILITY are enacted on the system. 
In order to process the data correctly by the Dissemination System, 
P.DATA_MARKING must be used.  Data must be marked or tagged properly in order to 
correctly disseminate it.  These data markings include the access control attributes which 
are pivotal to the proper dissemination of data. 
D. SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
To address the threats, organizational security policies and assumptions described 
above, a set of security objectives for both the Dissemination System and the 
environment are required.  The Dissemination System security objectives are developed 
to mitigate the threats and implement the policies of the Dissemination System.  The 
security objectives for the environment are created to address the assumptions about the 
environment in which the Dissemination System operates.   
1. Dissemination System Security Objectives 
The security objectives for the Dissemination System are summarized in Table 4.   
The objective O.ACCESS requires the Dissemination System to only disseminate 
information in accordance with the access control policy and ensure that dissemination 
material is properly distributed only to authorized users.  The authorized users are 
provided with confidence that the received material is from the TCX Dissemination 
System and matches the master version maintained on the Dissemination System 
(O.USER_CONFIDENCE and O.SECURE_DELIVERY).  Prior to allowing the users to 
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access data, the Dissemination System will inform the users of proper user behavior, 
website policies, and required authentication methods (O.DISPLAY_BANNER and 
O.USER_GUIDANCE).  The Dissemination System will also provide mechanisms that 
control a user’s logical access to the system (O.SYSTEM_ACCESS). 
Multiple objectives exist to address the generation of audit data, protection of the 
audit trail, and analysis of audit records.  These objectives are 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION, O.AUDIT_PROTECTION, and O.AUDIT_REVIEW.  
Additionally, time stamps will be utilized by the audit mechanisms for accountability 
purposes as described by the O.TIME_STAMPS objective. 
To ensure that the administrator has all information necessary for securely 
administering the Dissemination System, administrative guidance will be provided 
(O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE).  
O.ACCESS The Dissemination System will ensure that 
users gain only authorized access to 
resources that it controls. 
O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE  The Dissemination System will provide 
administrators with the necessary 
information for secure management.  
O.AUDIT_GENERATION  The Dissemination System will provide the 
capability to detect and create records of 
security-relevant events associated with 
users.  
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION  The Dissemination System will provide the 
capability to protect audit information.  
O.AUDIT_REVIEW  The Dissemination System will provide the 
capability to view audit information. 
O.CONGIFURATION_MANAGEMENT The configuration of and all changes to the 
Dissemination System will be tracked and 
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controlled throughout the Dissemination 
System’s development. 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER The Dissemination System will display an 
advisory warning regarding use of the 
Dissemination System. 
O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN  The design of the Dissemination Application 
will be adequately and accurately 
documented.  
O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TESTING The Dissemination System will undergo 
some security functional testing that 
demonstrates that it satisfies some of its 
security functional requirements.  
O.SECURE_DELIVERY The Dissemination System will provide 
mechanisms for users to verify that any data 
disseminated matches the master version 
maintained by the Dissemination System. 
O.SOUND_IMPLEMENTION The implementation of the Dissemination 
Application will be an accurate instantiation 
of its design. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS The Dissemination System will provide 
mechanisms that control a user’s logical 
access to it. 
O.TIME_STAMPS  The Dissemination System will use time 
stamps for accountability purposes. 
O.USER_CONFIDENCE  The Dissemination System will provide 
mechanisms that permit end users to have 
confidence that received controlled-access 
data comes from the Dissemination System.  
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O.USER_GUIDANCE The Dissemination System will provide 
users with the necessary information for 
secure data access. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS  The Dissemination Application will undergo 
some vulnerability analysis to demonstrate 
the design and implementation do not 
contain any obvious flaws.  
Table 4. Functional Security Objectives 
The Dissemination System design will be sufficiently and correctly documented 
to ensure all functional requirements are satisfied (O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN).  The 
objective O.CONFIGURATION_MANAGEMENT requires all developmental material 
(both original and subsequent changes) be maintained by Configuration Management.  
The implementation of the Dissemination Application will be an accurate instantiation of 
the design specification as specified by O.SOUND_IMPLEMENTATION.  Following 
the implementation, a partial functional test and vulnerability analysis will be conducted 
to assure that the system satisfies a subset of the functional requirements and does not 
contain any obvious flaws (O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TESTING and 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS).  
2. Security Objectives for the Environment 
The security objectives state the goals that the IT Environment and the 
Dissemination Environment must address.  The objectives for the environment are 
summarized in Table 5.   
OE.DATA_MARKING All dissemination data will be properly marked with 
access control attributes by the Dissemination 
Environment. 
OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING The internal implementation and execution of the 
Dissemination System’s underlying operating system, 
web server, and cryptographic libraries will run as 
expected. 
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OE.MANAGE  The IT Environment will provide all the functions and 
facilities necessary to support the administrators in 
their management of the security of the Dissemination 
System, and restrict these functions and facilities from 
unauthorized use.  
OE.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN The IT Environment will provide only local 
capabilities for Dissemination System administration. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN The Dissemination Environment shall ensure that 
administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, 
and follow all administrator guidance. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY The Dissemination Environment shall ensure that all 
of its entities are trustworthy and protect both the 
dissemination data and the data they generate to 
support secure distribution. 
OE.PHYSICAL  Physical security, commensurate with the value of the 
Dissemination System and the data it contains, will be 
provided by the Dissemination Environment.  
OE.REGISTERED_USERS  The Dissemination Environment will provide a 
mechanism for users to register prior to accessing 
non-public material on the Dissemination System. 
OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP The IT Environment will provide reliable time stamps. 
OE.SYSTEM_PROTECTION The IT Environment will provide sufficient 
mechanisms to protect the Dissemination System’s 
data and memory during storage and execution.  
Table 5. Operational Environment Security Objectives 
The IT Environment will provide physical security to protect the Dissemination 
System and its data (OE.PHYSICAL).  In addition to the physical security, the IT 
Environment must also provide sufficient mechanisms to protect the data and memory on 
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the Dissemination System during its storage and execution 
(OE.SYSTEM_PROTECTION).  The Dissemination System administrators shall be non-
hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all administrator guidance as specified by the 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN objective.  The IT Environment will ensure that remote 
administration is not permitted on the Dissemination System thus fulfilling 
OE.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN. 
The IT Environment upon which the Dissemination System is built must assure 
that the operating system, web server, and cryptographic libraries function as expected 
(OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING).  OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP states that the IT 
Environment must also provide reliable time stamps for use by the Dissemination 
System.  The administrators of the Dissemination System will be provided with all the 
functions and facilities to securely administer the Dissemination System, as described in 
OE.MANAGE.   It is also the responsibility of the Dissemination Environment to assure 
that the entities within its domain are trustworthy as defined by 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY.  The Dissemination Environment must provide a mechanism 
for users to register for non-public access to data controlled by the Dissemination System.  
This is objective is defined as OE.REGISTERED_USERS. 
To properly disseminate data, the data must first be marked with dissemination 
access control attributes.  These access control attributes will be applied to dissemination 
data by the Dissemination Environment (OE.DATA_MARKING).   
E. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
1. Background 
The requirements for the Dissemination System can be split into two categories: 
requirements for trusted delivery and requirements for the dissemination of data.  Each 
threat must be mapped to one or more functional and/or assurance requirements whose 
purpose is to mitigate that threat.  However, all requirements will not map to a single 
threat.  
2. Secure Delivery 
The Dissemination System must be able to deliver data to evaluators in addition 
to the dissemination of project material across the Internet.  There are two parts to 
fulfilling the secure delivery requirement of the system.  First, the on-site versions of 
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documents must match the master version.  To assure this, documents will be signed so 
that their authenticity can be verified.  Additionally, an external signature verification 
tool shall be implemented to permit verification of the signatures on documents.  This 
tool must also be responsible for verifying the seal of the TCX kernel being disseminated.  
Second, if documents are modified after delivery, then they are not considered an 
evaluated version.  The secure delivery requirement can guarantee that upon delivery all 
documents shall be signed, but cannot protect the documents further.  End users may use 
the external signature verification tool to check signatures after downloading data from 
the system.  This shall be the users’ method of verifying that unmodified, complete 
versions of documents were received.  These two requirements mitigate the 
T.ALTERED_DATA threat to the dissemination web server by guaranteeing that the 
signed version is the only one to be disseminated to users.  This includes but is not 
limited to: XML documents, source code, and binaries. 
3. Dissemination of Data/Documents 
The dissemination of data imposes additional requirements necessary to mitigate 
the threats to the system.  Requirements for trusted delivery are also required for the 
dissemination of data, but will not be listed again. 
a. Identification and Authentication with Audit 
All users are required to register before accessing proprietary information 
on the Dissemination System.  This will be performed external to the Dissemination 
System.  Each registered user of the system is required to have a unique user 
identification (user ID) and a password.  The user is also assigned a user group which 
will be used to determine more granular access.  The user is required to login to the 
system for access to non-public documents.  The login process requires the user to enter 
his or her user ID and password to authenticate to the server.   
Audit logging will be required in order to monitor the identification and 
authentication process.  Security critical events shall be audited to include: dissemination 
of new documents to the server, changes to existing documents, and changing of user 
access levels.  Additionally, the login and logoff process will be audited.  The security 
policy for the system will describe all necessary audit logging for the system and will 
include the aforementioned. 
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b. Group-based Access Control 
The group-based access control allows all users to be placed in a group, or 
a collection of groups, for access to data.  These groups include: administrator, 
collaborator, customer, developer, evaluator, NIST/NSA validators, and public.  All 
documents shall contain an access control list specifying which groups have access to 
that particular document.  These access control lists shall be in the form of XML tags 
embedded in the document.  As stated previously, non-XML documents shall have access 
control tags in XML document descriptor files. 
c. XML Binding and XSL Transformations 
All documents disseminated shall be XML documents or have an XML 
document descriptor file.  XML access control tags will be either embedded in the XML 
document or the document descriptor file.  These tags will be processed by the 
Dissemination System in order to disseminate material to the proper users.  Note that if 
the tags of the document are modified, the document will no longer have a valid 
signature.   
To display documents via a standard web browser, the XML documents 
shall require XSL transformations.  This will allow the conversion of XML to HTML and 
simple viewing across the Internet.  The XML tags shall be crucial in formatting the 
documents, but will not be visible when viewed by a web browser.  Additionally, for 
integrity verification the HTML document will have a web link to download the source 
XML document containing its digital signature. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The TCX project is most useful by being disseminated across the Internet so that 
others can learn from it.  The Dissemination System has specific assumptions and threats 
that must be dealt with in order to maintain the security of information.  Additionally, 
organizational security policies help to clarify the actual use of the system.  The 
assumptions, threats, and policies help to determine the requirements for the 
Dissemination System.  With specific requirements, the design and future implementation 
will be better developed to obtain maximum functionality and security on the 
Dissemination System.  This all contributes to the fulfillment of the high level system 
functional description while mitigating the threats through specific requirements. 
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IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
This chapter contains the security requirements for the Dissemination System and 
the Dissemination Application as driven by the assumptions, threats, policies, and 
objectives.  Although these requirements were developed using the Common Criteria [2] 
as a framework, they do not follow the Common Criteria constructs and language.  
Additionally, the requirements are broken into two categories: security functional 
requirements and security assurance requirements.  Next, the mapping of the security 
objectives to the threats, policies, and assumptions, and the mapping of the requirements 
to the security objectives are provided. 
A. DISSEMINATION SYSTEM SECURITY FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
1. Dissemination System Audit 
1.1 The Dissemination System shall have configurable auditing capabilities.  
Audit levels shall be hierarchical from the least amount of information to the most.  The 
Dissemination System shall support the following audit levels: alert, critical, error, 
warning, notice, information, and debugging.  All audited events shall be recorded. 
1.2 The date and time of the event, number of bytes sent to the server, the 
remote host name or IP address, type of event, user identity (if applicable), and the 
outcome (success or failure) shall be recorded. 
1.3 The audit records generated by the Dissemination System shall be in a 
format that can be parsed. 
1.4 An authorized administrator shall be able to select the amount of time 
between audit log rotations.  This shall be configurable for daily, weekly, or monthly 
rotations.  Additionally, the administrator shall be able to specify how many rotated logs 
are kept on the system before being archived. 
2. Dissemination System Communication  
2.1 The Dissemination System shall employ cryptographic functionality to 
provide a secure connection between the Dissemination System and the users. 
3. Dissemination System Cryptography  
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3.1 The Dissemination System shall use a digital certificate signed by an 
authorized Certificate Authority for authenticating itself to the users. 
4. Dissemination System User Data Protection  
4.1 The Dissemination System shall enforce the access control policy on all 
registered users and data on the system.  This policy shall be enforced based on the user 
ID and group membership for the data requested. 
5. Dissemination System Identification and Authentication  
5.1 The Dissemination System shall ensure that users are identified and 
authenticated in order to associate them with the proper security attributes while 
accessing data.  Security attributes shall include but are not limited to the user’s identity 
and the group(s) to which that user belongs. 
5.2 The Dissemination System shall authenticate registered users based on 
their user ID and password. 
5.3 The Dissemination System shall authenticate users prior to allowing 
access to any non-public documents on the Dissemination System. 
6. Dissemination System Access 
6.1 The Dissemination System shall clearly display an access banner 
describing the restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information 
to which users consent by accessing the system. 
B. DISSEMINATION SYSTEM SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 
1. Dissemination System Configuration Management 
1.1 The Dissemination System’s third party software and documentation 
including configuration files shall be maintained under Configuration Management.  
2. Dissemination System Guidance Documents 
2.1 The user guidance shall describe the interaction between the user and the 
Dissemination System for proper retrieval of releasable data. 
2.2 The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary 
for secure use of the Dissemination System, including those related to assumptions 
regarding user behavior found in the access banner. 
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2.3 The administrative guidance shall describe the procedures and technical 
measures necessary to restrict physical access to the system. 
2.4 The administrative guidance shall cover configuration, maintenance, and 
administration of the Dissemination System in a secure manner.  The guidance is 
intended to help administrators understand the security functions of the Dissemination 
System, including both those functions that require the administrator to perform security-
critical actions and those functions that provide security-critical information to the 
administrator [2]. 
2.5 The administrative guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces 
available to the administrator in addition to how to manage the Dissemination System in 
a secure manner [2]. 
2.6 The administrative guidance shall describe all security requirements for 
the Dissemination Environment that are relevant to the administrator and the 
Dissemination System. 
3. Dissemination System Testing 
3.1 The Dissemination System test plan shall cover expected usage of the 
Dissemination System in addition to limited testing of unexpected situations.  This partial 
functional testing shall ensure that the Dissemination System properly performs functions 
required for dissemination.   
C. DISSEMINATION APPLICATION SECURITY FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
1. Dissemination Application Audit 
1.1 The Dissemination Application shall have configurable auditing 
capabilities.  All audited events shall be recorded. 
1.2 The date and time of the event, type of event, user identity (if applicable), 
and the outcome (success or failure) shall be recorded. 
1.3 The audit records generated by the Dissemination Application shall be in a 
format that can be parsed. 
2. Dissemination Application User Data Protection 
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2.1 The Dissemination Application shall enforce the policy based on the 
following dissemination file attributes: file type marking, file sensitivity marking. 
2.2 The Dissemination Application shall enforce all dissemination access 
control mechanisms on all dissemination material present on the server. 
2.3 The Dissemination Application shall not modify the digital signatures 
placed on the dissemination material by the Configuration Management system. 
2.4 The Dissemination Application shall redact each releasable document in 
accordance with the dissemination policy. 
D. DISSEMINATION APPLICATION SECURITY ASSURANCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
1. Dissemination Application Configuration Management 
1.1 The Dissemination Application documents (e.g. functional specification) 
and software shall be archived using the CM process. 
2. Dissemination Application Operation 
2.1 Installation and startup procedures shall be documented within the 
administrative guidance to ensure that the Dissemination Application has been installed 
and started in a secure manner, as intended by the developer. 
3. Dissemination Application Development 
3.1 An informal high level design specification shall be developed for the 
Dissemination Application. 
3.2 The design of the Dissemination Application shall meet the functional 
requirements. 
3.3 The Dissemination Application shall be implemented in accordance with 
the design. 
4. Dissemination Application Guidance Documents 
4.1 The administrative guidance shall cover configuration, maintenance, and 
administration of the Dissemination Application in a secure manner.   
4.2 The administrative guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces 
available to the administrator in addition to how to manage the Dissemination 
Application in a secure manner [2].   
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4.3 The administrative guidance shall describe all security requirements for 
the Dissemination System that are relevant to the administrator and the Dissemination 
Application. 
5. Dissemination Application Life Cycle Support 
5.1 The Dissemination Application shall follow the same spiral life cycle 
model and procedures as the TCX project. 
6. Dissemination Application Testing and Vulnerability Assessment 
6.1 The developer shall develop a test plan to cover expected usage of the 
Dissemination Application in addition to limited testing of unexpected situations.  This 
partial functional testing shall ensure that the Dissemination Application properly handles 
access to releasable items while maintaining its own configuration [2]. 
6.2 To help mitigate misuse of the Dissemination Application the guidance 
documentation shall be complete, clear, consistent, and reasonable.  It shall list the 
assumptions about the environment, and requirements for external security measures [2]. 
6.3 The developer shall perform a vulnerability assessment of the 
Dissemination Application along with provision of vulnerability analysis documentation 
[2]. 
E. IT ENVIRONMENT SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. IT Environment Security Management  
1.1 The IT Environment shall restrict the ability to perform the following 
functions to the authorized administrator: enable, disable, and modify the audit settings; 
backup and restore audit records; adjust the configuration parameters; and modification 
of any databases used by the Dissemination Application. 
1.2 The IT Environment shall restrict the ability to modify the security 
attributes of both data and users of the system to the authorized administrator. 
2. IT Environment Access  
2.1 The IT Environment shall lock a local interactive administrator session 
after a specified period of inactivity by disabling system access to data and display 
devices other than the ability to unlock the session.  The IT Environment shall require re-
authentication by the administrative user prior to unlocking the session. 
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3. IT Environment Data Protection 
3.1 The IT Environment shall restrict the ability to create or modify webpage 
content to authorized administrators. 
3.2 The IT Environment shall be capable of limiting the ability to create or 
modify server executable content [2]. 
3.3 The IT Environment shall protect the Dissemination System’s private key 
from unauthorized modification and viewing. 
4. IT Environment Audit 
4.1 The IT Environment shall restrict all non-administrative users of the 
Dissemination System from reading from and writing to the audit trail. 
4.2 The IT Environment shall be able to provide time stamps for its own use. 
5. IT Environment Identification and Authentication 
5.1 The IT Environment shall ensure that users are identified and 
authenticated in order to associate them with the proper security attributes while 
accessing data.  Security attributes shall include but are not limited to the user’s identity 
and the group(s) to which that user belongs. 
F. DISSEMINATION ENVIRONMENT SECURITY FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
1. Dissemination Environment Security Management 
1.1 The Dissemination Environment shall provide a mechanism for users to 
register prior to accessing non-public material on the Dissemination System. 
2. Dissemination Environment User Data Protection 
2.1 The Dissemination Environment shall properly mark all dissemination 
data with access control attributes. 
3. Dissemination Environment Protection 
3.1 The Dissemination Environment shall ensure that all data generated by its 
entities required for proper dissemination is protected in situ and during transit. 
G. REQUIREMENTS MAPPING 
All assumptions, threats, policies, and security objectives were previously defined 
in Chapter III.  Using the Common Criteria methodology, this section maps the threats 
and policies to the security objectives of the Dissemination System.  Then the 
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assumptions are mapped to the security objectives of the environment.  Finally, the 
mapping of the requirements to the security objectives is presented.  The rationale in this 
section was adapted from the Web Server Protection Profile and the Separation Kernel 
Protection Profile in addition to the Basic Robustness Consistency Instruction Manual [2, 
9, 12]. 
1. Threat and Policy Mapping 
Table 6 contains the mapping of the objectives to the threats and policies and 
provides the rationale for how the objectives mitigate the threats and implement the 
policies.   
Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing the 
Threats and Policies 
Rationale 
T.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERR
OR:  The administrator may 
incorrectly install or configure 
the Dissemination System which 
could lead to additional threats 
and vulnerabilities. 
O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide administrators with the 
necessary information for secure 
management. 
O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE helps to 
mitigate this threat by requiring 
the system administrators to have 
guidance that instructs them how 
to administer the system in a 
secure manner.  Having this 
guidance helps to reduce the 
mistakes that an administrator 
might make that could cause an 
insecure configuration. 
T.ACCIDENTAL_AUDIT_COM
PROMISE:  A user may 
accidentally view, modify or 
delete audit records resulting in a 
user’s actions to be masked. 
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION:  The 
Dissemination System will 




requires that this threat be 
mitigated by controlling access to 
the audit trail.  Only the system 
administrator is provided 
read/write access to the audit 
trail. 
T.ALTERED_DATA:  The end 
user version of dissemination 
data may differ from the master 
version of the releasable data 
maintained by the Dissemination 
System thus resulting in 
O.SECURE_DELIVERY:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide mechanisms for users to 
verify that any data disseminated 
matches the master version 
maintained by the Dissemination 
O.SECURE_DELIVERY 
requires that this threat be 
mitigated by providing a 
mechanism to allow the end user 
to verify the integrity of the 
dissemination material through 
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corrupted delivery. System. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide mechanisms that control 
a user’s logical access to it. 
the use of digital signatures. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS requires 
that mechanisms are implemented 
that protect the master version of 
the releasable data from 
unauthorized access. 
T.MASQUERADE:  A foreign 
entity may masquerade as the 
Dissemination System resulting 
in misrepresentation of the 
Dissemination System’s 
controlled dissemination data. 
O.USER_CONFIDENCE:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide mechanisms that permit 
end users to have confidence that 
received controlled-access data 
comes from the Dissemination 
System. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide users with the necessary 
information for secure data 
access. 
O.USER_CONFIDENCE 
requires that this threat be 
mitigated by server authentication 
mechanisms that allow the 
Dissemination System to 
authenticate itself to the client 
prior to users accessing 
controlled dissemination data. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE helps to 
mitigate this threat by requiring 
the user guidance to describe the 
server authentication method and 
how to configure the client to 
authenticate the server. 
T.POOR_DESIGN:  
Unintentional errors in the 
requirements specification or 
design of the Dissemination 
Application may occur, leading to 
flaws that may be exploited by a 
casually mischievous user or 
program. 
O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN:  
The design of the Dissemination 
Application will be adequately 
and accurately documented. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYS
IS:  The Dissemination 
Application will undergo some 
vulnerability analysis to 
demonstrate the design and 
implementation do not contain 
any obvious flaws. 
O.CONFIGURATION_MANAG
EMENT:  The configuration of 
and all changes to the 
Dissemination System will be 
O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN 
requires that the design of the 
Dissemination Application be 
documented, permitting review 
for poor design and, thus, 
mitigating this threat. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYS
IS requires that the design of the 
Dissemination Application be 
analyzed for design flaws. 
To mitigate this threat, 
O.CONFIGURATION_MANAG
EMENT requires that changes to 
the system design be tracked, 
thus mitigating the threat that 
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tracked and controlled throughout 
the Dissemination System’s 
development. 
changes could result in poor 
design of the system. 
T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION:  
Unintentional errors in 
implementation of the 
Dissemination Application design 
may occur, leading to flaws that 
may be exploited by a casually 
mischievous user or program. 
O.SOUND_IMPLEMENTATIO
N:  The implementation of the 
Dissemination Application will 
be an accurate instantiation of its 
design. 
O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_T
ESTING:  The Dissemination 
System will undergo some 
security functional testing that 
demonstrates that it satisfies 
some of its security functional 
requirements. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYS
IS:  The Dissemination 
Application will undergo some 
vulnerability analysis to 
demonstrate the design and 
implementation do not contain 
any obvious flaws. 
O.CONFIGURATION_MANAG
EMENT:  The configuration of 
and all changes to the 
Dissemination System will be 
tracked and controlled throughout 
the Dissemination System’s 
development. 
To mitigate this threat, 
O.SOUND_IMPLEMENTATIO
N requires that the 
implementation be an accurate 
representation of the design. 
To mitigate this threat, 
O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_T
ESTING requires testing that 
increases the likelihood that any 
errors that do exist in the 
implementation will be 
discovered. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYS
IS mitigates this threat by 
requiring the reduction of errors 
in the implementation that may 
not be discovered during 
functional testing.  Ambiguous 
design documentation and the 
fact that exhaustive testing of the 
external interfaces is not required 
may leave flaws in the 
implementation undiscovered in 
functional testing. 
O.CONFIGURATION_MANAG
EMENT helps to mitigate this 
threat by requiring that all 
modifications to the 
Dissemination Application be 
tracked thus reducing the number 
of potential exploits. 
T.POOR_TEST:  Lack of or O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_T O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_T
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insufficient tests of the 
Dissemination Application to 
demonstrate that all security 
functions operate correctly may 
result in incorrect behavior being 
undiscovered thereby causing 
potential security vulnerabilities. 
ESTING:  The Dissemination 
System will undergo some 
security functional testing that 
demonstrates that it satisfies 
some of its security functional 
requirements. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYS
IS:  The Dissemination 
Application will undergo some 
vulnerability analysis to 
demonstrate the design and 
implementation do not contain 
any obvious flaws. 
ESTING helps to mitigate this 
threat by requiring testing that 
increases the likelihood that any 
errors that do exist in the 
implementation will be 
discovered. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYS
IS addresses this concern by 
requiring a vulnerability analysis 
be performed in conjunction with 
testing that goes beyond 
functional testing.  This objective 
provides a measure of confidence 
that the Dissemination 
Application does not contain 
security flaws that may not be 
identified through functional 
testing. 
T.ROGUE_ENTITY:  The 
Dissemination Environment 
entities, other than the 
Dissemination System, may not 
be trustworthy thus resulting in 
the improper dissemination of 
data. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY:  The 
Dissemination Environment shall 
ensure that all of its entities are 
trustworthy and protect both the 
dissemination data and the data 
they generate to support secure 
distribution. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY 
addresses this threat by requiring 
that the Dissemination 
Environment ensure that all of its 
entities are trustworthy and 
protect the data they generate. 
T.SYSTEM_COMPROMISE:  
The Dissemination System data 
and/or code may be 
inappropriately accessed resulting 
in the improper dissemination of 
data to users. 
OE.SYSTEM_PROTECTION:  
The IT Environment will provide 
sufficient mechanisms to protect 
the Dissemination System’s data 
and memory during storage and 
execution. 
OE.MANAGE:  The IT 
Environment will provide all the 
functions and facilities necessary 
to support the administrators in 
their management of the security 
OE.SYSTEM_PROTECTION 
partially mitigates this threat by 
requiring access controls on the 
data and code of the system thus 
protecting data and code during 
storage and execution. 
OE.MANAGE partially mitigates 
this threat by requiring that the 
administrator be provided with 
the functions necessary to control 
access to data and code on the 
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of the Dissemination System, and 
restrict these functions and 
facilities from unauthorized use. 
OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING:  
The internal implementation and 
execution of the Dissemination 
System’s underlying operation 
system, web server, and 




requires partial mitigation of this 
threat by assuming that the 
underlying operating system, web 
server, and cryptographic 
libraries operate as expected. 
 
T.UNATTENDED_SESSION:  
A user may gain unauthorized 
access to an unattended 
administrator session. 
OE.MANAGE:  The IT 
Environment will provide all the 
functions and facilities necessary 
to support the administrators in 
their management of the security 
of the Dissemination System, and 
restrict these functions and 
facilities from unauthorized use. 
OE.MANAGE helps to mitigate 
this threat by requiring 
mechanisms that place controls 
on user’s sessions to be 
implemented.  Local 
administrator’s sessions are 
locked after a system 
administrator defined time period 
of inactivity.  Locking the local 
administrator’s session reduces 
the opportunity of someone 
gaining unauthorized access to 
the session when the console is 
unattended. 
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS:  
A user may gain access to 
dissemination data for which the 
user is not authorized according 
to the access control attributes of 
the data. 
O.ACCESS:  The Dissemination 
System will ensure that users gain 
only authorized access to 
resources that it controls. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide mechanisms that control 
a user’s logical access to it. 
OE.DATA_MARKING:  All 
dissemination data will be 
properly marked with access 
To partially mitigate this threat, 
O.ACCESS requires that all 
access to dissemination data be 
strictly controlled according to 
the access control attributes for 
each data item.     
To partially mitigate this threat, 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS requires 
mechanisms that identify and 
authenticate the user prior to the 




OE.REGISTERED_USERS:  The 
Dissemination Environment will 
provide a mechanism for users to 
register prior to accessing non-
public material on the 
Dissemination System. 
OE.DATA_MARKING requires 
that dissemination data be 
properly marked with access 
control attributes. 
The mechanism required by 
OE.REGISTERED_USERS will 
provide the user authentication 
data that will be used to 
authenticate users.  This will help 
mitigate the threat of 
unauthorized access. 
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS:  
The administrator may not have 
the ability to notice potential 
security violations, thus limiting 
the administrator’s ability to 
identify and take action against a 
possible security breach. 
O.AUDIT_REVIEW:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide the capability to view 
audit information. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide the capability to detect 
and create records of security-
relevant events associated with 
users. 
O.TIME_STAMPS:  The 
Dissemination System will use 
time stamps for accountability 
purposes. 
OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP:  
The IT Environment will provide 
reliable time stamps. 
O.AUDIT_REVIEW helps to 
mitigate this threat by requiring 
that the system administrator be 
provided with the capability to 
review audit data for activity that 
could indicate a potential security 
violation. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION helps 
to mitigate this threat requiring 
that auditable events be recorded 
for later review. 
O.TIME_STAMPS helps to 
mitigate this threat by requiring 
that audit records have correct 
time stamps. 
OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP 
helps to mitigate this threat by 
requiring that the time stamp 
functions used by the 
Dissemination System be 
provided. 
P.ACCESS_BANNER:  The 
Dissemination System will 
present a banner to all users 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER:  The 
Dissemination System will 
display an advisory warning 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER satisfies 
this policy by requiring that the 
Dissemination System display an 
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describing restrictions of use, 
legal agreements, or any other 
appropriate information to which 
users consent by accessing the 
system. 
regarding use of the 
Dissemination System. 
administrator configurable banner 
that provides all interactive users 
with a warning about the 
unauthorized use of the 
Dissemination System and its 
government ownership. 
P.ACCOUNTABILITY:  The 
authorized users of the system 
shall be held accountable for their 
actions on the system. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide the capability to detect 
and create records of security-
relevant events associated with 
users. 
O.TIME_STAMPS:  The 
Dissemination System will use 
time stamps for accountability 
purposes. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide users with the necessary 
information for secure data 
access. 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER:  The 
Dissemination System will 
display an advisory warning 
regarding use of the 
Dissemination System. 
OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP:  
The IT Environment will provide 
reliable time stamps. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS:  The 
Dissemination System will 
provide mechanisms that control 
a user’s logical access to it. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION 
addresses this policy by requiring 
that the system administrator be 
provided with a means of 
assuring that users are 
accountable for their actions.  
O.TIME_STAMPS addresses this 
policy by requiring that time 
stamps be provided to trace user 
actions for which they are 
accountable. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE addresses 
this policy by requiring that all 
the information necessary for 
users to securely access 
dissemination material be 
provided.  User guidance 
inherently includes acceptable 
activities that are allowed on the 
system.  
O.DISPLAY_BANNER 
addresses this policy by requiring 
warnings that users are 
accountable for their actions on 
the system and that are displayed 
at every access to the system. 
OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP 
addresses this policy by requiring 
that time stamp functions be 
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provided for use by the 
Dissemination System. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS addresses 
this policy by requiring that 
identification and authentication 
mechanisms be provided to help 
implement user accountability. 
P.DATA_MARKING:  All 
dissemination data will be 
properly marked with access 
control attributes. 
OE.DATA_MARKING:  All 
dissemination data will be 
properly marked with access 
control attributes by the 
Dissemination Environment. 
OE.DATA_MARKING 
addresses this policy by requiring 
that the Dissemination 
Environment provide data 
markings for access control. 
Table 6. Threat and Policy Mapping 
2. Assumption Mapping 
Table 7 contains the mapping between the assumptions and the environment 
security objectives and the rationale for how the objectives address the assumptions. 




The internal implementation and 
execution of the Dissemination 
System’s underlying operating 
system, web server, and 
cryptographic libraries run as 
expected. 
OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING:  
The internal implementation and 
execution of the Dissemination 
System’s underlying operating 
system, web server, and 
cryptographic libraries will run 
as expected. 
OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING 
addresses this assumption by 
requiring that the internal 
implementation and execution of 
the Dissemination System’s 
underlying operating system, 
web server, and cryptographic 
libraries run as expected. 
A.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN:  
Administrators are non-hostile, 
appropriately trained and follow all 
administrator guidance. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN:  The 
Dissemination Environment shall 
ensure that administrators are 
non-hostile, appropriately 
trained, and follow all 
administrator guidance. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN 
addresses this assumption by 
requiring that the Dissemination 
Environment ensure that 
administrators are non-hostile, 
appropriately trained, and follow 
all administrator guidance. 
A.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN:  All OE.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN:  OE.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN 
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administrative functions will be 
performed with access to the 
physical computer. 
The IT Environment will provide 
only local capabilities for 
Dissemination System 
administration.. 
addresses this assumption by 
requiring that the IT 
Environment provide only local 
capabilities for Dissemination 
System administration. 
A.PHYSICAL:  The Dissemination 
Environment will provide physical 
security commensurate with the 
value of the data being served by 
the Dissemination System. 
OE.PHYSICAL:  Physical 
security, commensurate with the 
value of the Dissemination 
System and the data it contains, 
will be provided by the 
Dissemination Environment. 
OE.PHYSICAL addresses this 
assumption by requiring that 
physical security, commensurate 
with the value of the 
Dissemination System and the 
data it contains, be provided by 
the Dissemination Environment. 
Table 7. Assumption Mapping 
 
3. Requirements Mapping 
This section maps the requirements to the objectives that they support and 
explains how the requirements implement the objectives.  The requirements were defined 
in sections A through F of this chapter.  Table 8 consists of two parts.  Part I maps the 
requirements to the security objectives of the Dissemination System.  Part II shows the 
mapping between the environment objectives and the requirements implemented by the 
Dissemination Environment and the IT Environment.   
PART I:  SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS MAPPING 
O.ACCESS:  The Dissemination System will ensure that users gain only authorized access to resources that 
it controls. 
A.4.1 The Dissemination System shall enforce the access control policy on all registered users and data 
on the system.  This policy shall be enforced based on the user ID and group membership for the data 
requested. 
C.2.1 The Dissemination Application shall enforce the policy based on the following dissemination file 
attributes: file type marking, file sensitivity marking. 
C.2.2 The Dissemination Application shall enforce all dissemination access control mechanisms on all 
dissemination material present on the server. 
C.2.4 The Dissemination Application shall redact each releasable document in accordance with the 
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dissemination policy. 
O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE:  The Dissemination System will provide administrators with the necessary 
information for secure management. 
B.2.3 The administrative guidance shall describe the procedures and technical measures necessary to 
restrict physical access to the system. 
B.2.4 The administrative guidance shall cover configuration, maintenance, and administration of the 
Dissemination System in a secure manner.  The guidance is intended to help administrators understand the 
security functions of the Dissemination System, including both those functions that require the 
administrator to perform security-critical actions and those functions that provide security-critical 
information to the administrator. 
B.2.5 The administrative guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces available to the 
administrator in addition to how to manage the Dissemination System in a secure manner. 
B.2.6 The administrative guidance shall describe all security requirements for the Dissemination 
Environment that are relevant to the administrator and the Dissemination System. 
D.2.1 Installation and startup procedures shall be documented within the administrative guidance to 
ensure that the Dissemination Application has been installed and started in a secure manner, as intended by 
the developer. 
D.4.1 The administrative guidance shall cover configuration, maintenance, and administration of the 
Dissemination Application in a secure manner.   
D.4.2 The administrative guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces available to the 
administrator in addition to how to manage the Dissemination Application in a secure manner.   
D.4.3 The administrative guidance shall describe all security requirements for the Dissemination System 
that are relevant to the administrator and the Dissemination Application. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION:  The Dissemination System will provide the capability to detect and create 
records of security-relevant events associated with users. 
A.1.1 The Dissemination System shall have configurable auditing capabilities.  Audit levels shall be 
hierarchical from the least amount of information to the most.  The Dissemination System shall support the 
following audit levels: alert, critical, error, warning, notice, information, and debugging.  All audited events 
shall be recorded. 
A.1.2 The date and time of the event, number of bytes sent to the server, the remote host name or IP 
address, type of event, user identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) shall be recorded. 
C.1.1 The Dissemination Application shall have configurable auditing capabilities.  All audited events 
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shall be recorded. 
C.1.2 The date and time of the event, type of event, user identity (if applicable), and the outcome 
(success or failure) shall be recorded. 
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION:  The Dissemination System will provide the capability to protect audit 
information. 
A.1.4 An authorized administrator shall be able to select the amount of time between audit log rotations.  
This shall be configurable for daily, weekly, or monthly rotations.  Additionally, the administrator shall be 
able to specify how many rotated logs are kept on the system before being archived. 
O.AUDIT_REVIEW:  The Dissemination System will provide the capability to view audit information. 
A.1.3 The audit records generated by the Dissemination System shall be in a format that can be parsed. 
C.1.3 The audit records generated by the Dissemination Application shall be in a format that can be 
parsed. 
O.CONGIFURATION_MANAGEMENT:  The configuration of and all changes to the Dissemination 
System will be tracked and controlled throughout the Dissemination System’s development. 
B.1.1 The Dissemination System’s third party software and documentation including configuration files 
shall be maintained under Configuration Management. 
D.1.1 The Dissemination Application documents (e.g. functional specification) and software shall be 
archived using the CM process. 
D.5.1 The Dissemination Application shall follow the same spiral life cycle model and procedures as the 
TCX project. 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER:  The Dissemination System will display an advisory warning regarding use of the 
Dissemination System. 
A.6.1     The Dissemination System shall clearly display an access banner describing the restrictions of use, 
legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the system. 
B.2.2 The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary for secure use of the 
Dissemination System, including those related to assumptions regarding user behavior found in the access 
banner. 
O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN:  The design of the Dissemination Application will be adequately and 
accurately documented. 
D.3.1 An informal high level design specification shall be developed for the Dissemination Application. 
D.3.2 The design of the Dissemination Application shall meet the functional requirements. 
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O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TESTING:  The Dissemination System will undergo some security 
functional testing that demonstrates that it satisfies some of its security functional requirements. 
B.3.1 The Dissemination System test plan shall cover expected usage of the Dissemination System in 
addition to limited testing of unexpected situations.  This partial functional testing shall ensure that the 
Dissemination System properly performs functions required for dissemination. 
D.6.1 The developer shall develop a test plan to cover expected usage of the Dissemination Application 
in addition to limited testing of unexpected situations.  This partial functional testing shall ensure that the 
Dissemination Application properly handles access to releasable items while maintaining its own 
configuration. 
O.SECURE_DELIVERY:  The Dissemination System will provide mechanisms for users to verify that any 
data disseminated matches the master version maintained by the Dissemination System. 
C.2.3 The Dissemination Application shall not modify the digital signatures placed on the dissemination 
material by the Configuration Management system. 
O.SOUND_IMPLEMENTION:  The implementation of the Dissemination Application will be an accurate 
instantiation of its design. 
D.3.3 The Dissemination Application shall be implemented in accordance with the design. 
O.SYSTEM_ACCESS:  The Dissemination System will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical 
access to it. 
A.5.1 The Dissemination System shall ensure that users are identified and authenticated in order to 
associate them with the proper security attributes while accessing data.  Security attributes shall include but 
are not limited to the user’s identity and the group(s) to which that user belongs. 
A.5.2 The Dissemination System shall authenticate registered users based on their user ID and password. 
A.5.3 The Dissemination System shall authenticate users prior to allowing access to any non-public 
documents on the Dissemination System. 
O.TIME_STAMPS:  The Dissemination System will use time stamps for accountability purposes. 
A.1.2 The date and time of the event, number of bytes sent to the server, the remote host name or IP 
address, type of event, user identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) shall be recorded. 
C.1.2 The date and time of the event, type of event, user identity (if applicable), and the outcome 
(success or failure) shall be recorded. 
O.USER_CONFIDENCE:  The Dissemination System will provide mechanisms that permit end users to 
have confidence that received controlled-access data comes from the Dissemination System. 
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A.2.1 The Dissemination System shall employ cryptographic functionality to provide a secure 
connection between the Dissemination System and the users. 
A.3.1 The Dissemination System shall use a digital certificate signed by an authorized Certificate 
Authority for authenticating itself to the users. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE:  The Dissemination System will provide users with the necessary information for 
secure data access. 
B.2.1 The user guidance shall describe the interaction between the user and the Dissemination System 
for proper retrieval of releasable data. 
B.2.2 The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary for secure use of the 
Dissemination System, including those related to assumptions regarding user behavior found in the access 
banner. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS:  The Dissemination Application will undergo some vulnerability 
analysis to demonstrate the design and implementation do not contain any obvious flaws.  
D.6.2 To help mitigate misuse of the Dissemination Application the guidance documentation shall be 
complete, clear, consistent, and reasonable.  It shall list the assumptions about the environment, and 
requirements for external security measures. 
D.6.3 The developer shall perform a vulnerability assessment of the Dissemination Application along 
with provision of vulnerability analysis documentation. 
 
PART II:  ENVIRONMENT REQUIREMENTS MAPPING 
OE.DATA_MARKING:  All dissemination data will be properly marked with access control attributes by 
the Dissemination Environment. 
F.2.1 The Dissemination Environment shall properly mark all dissemination data with access control 
attributes. 
OE.INTERNAL_PROCESSING:  The internal implementation and execution of the Dissemination 
System’s underlying operating system, web server, and cryptographic libraries will run as expected. 
This objective addresses the assumption A.INTERNAL_PROCESSING and has no corresponding security 
functional requirement. 
OE.MANAGE:  The IT Environment will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the 
administrators in their management of the security of the Dissemination System, and restrict these functions 
and facilities from unauthorized use.  
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E.1.1 The IT Environment shall restrict the ability to perform the following functions to the authorized 
administrator: enable, disable, and modify the audit settings; backup and restore audit records; adjust the 
configuration parameters; and modification of any databases used by the Dissemination Application. 
E.1.2 The IT Environment shall restrict the ability to modify the security attributes of both data and 
users of the system to the authorized administrator. 
E.2.1 The IT Environment shall lock a local interactive administrator session after a specified period of 
inactivity by disabling system access to data and display devices other than the ability to unlock the 
session.  The IT Environment shall require re-authentication by the administrative user prior to unlocking 
the session. 
E.5.1 The IT Environment shall ensure that users are identified and authenticated in order to associate 
them with the proper security attributes while accessing data.  Security attributes shall include but are not 
limited to the user’s identity and the group(s) to which that user belongs. 
OE.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN:  The IT Environment will provide only local capabilities for Dissemination 
System administration. 
This objective addresses the assumption A.NO_REMOTE_ADMIN and has no corresponding security 
functional requirement. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN:  The Dissemination Environment shall ensure that administrators are non-
hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all administrator guidance. 
This objective addresses the assumption A.NO_ROGUE_ADMIN and has no corresponding security 
functional requirement. 
OE.NO_ROGUE_ENTITY:  The Dissemination Environment shall ensure that all of its entities are 
trustworthy and protect both the dissemination data and the data they generate to support secure 
distribution. 
F.3.1 The Dissemination Environment shall ensure that all data generated by its entities required for 
proper dissemination is protected in situ and during transit. 
OE.PHYSICAL:  Physical security, commensurate with the value of the Dissemination System and the data 
it contains, will be provided by the Dissemination Environment.  
This objective addresses the assumption A.PHYSICAL and has no corresponding security functional 
requirement. 
OE.REGISTERED_USERS:  The Dissemination Environment will provide a mechanism for users to 
register prior to accessing non-public material on the Dissemination System. 
F.1.1 The Dissemination Environment shall provide a mechanism for users to register prior to accessing 
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non-public material on the Dissemination System. 
OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP:  The IT Environment will provide reliable time stamps.  
E.4.2 The IT Environment shall be able to provide time stamps for its own use. 
OE.SYSTEM_PROTECTION:  The IT Environment will provide sufficient mechanisms to protect the 
Dissemination System’s data and memory during storage and execution.  
E.3.1 The IT Environment shall restrict the ability to create or modify webpage content to authorized 
administrators. 
E.3.2 The IT Environment shall be capable of limiting the ability to create or modify server executable 
content. 
E.3.3 The IT Environment shall protect the Dissemination System’s private key from unauthorized 
modification and viewing. 
E.4.1 The IT Environment shall restrict all non-administrative users of the Dissemination System from 
reading from and writing to the audit trail. 
Table 8. Requirements Mapping 
H. SUMMARY 
The functional and assurance requirements for the Dissemination System and the 
Dissemination Application were specified.  Functional security requirements for the 
Dissemination Environment and the IT Environment were also presented.  The mapping 
of the assumptions, threats, policies, security objectives, and requirements was then 
produced.  Additionally, the rationale for some of the mapping was presented.  The next 
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V. DESIGN SPECIFICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The functional security requirements described in Chapter IV provide the basis 
for the design of the initial implementation of the Dissemination System.  This chapter 
includes a design overview and a high level design specification.  The design overview 
briefly discusses the system processes and databases used by the Dissemination System.  
Following the overview is the complete design specification. 
B. DESIGN OVERVIEW 
This section provides a brief description of the design of the initial 
implementation of the Dissemination System.   
The Dissemination System is made up of multiple system processes and a set of 
supporting tools running on an open-source operating system.  The system processes are 
an Apache Web Server, the TCX Dissemination Application, crond, logrotate, and 
webalizer.  The last three processes are collectively known as administrative tools.  The 
supporting tools include the OpenSSL tool and the linkcheck.pl Perl script.  The figure 
below depicts the architecture of the Dissemination System. 
 
Figure 3.   Dissemination System Architecture 
Each system process is responsible for implementing specific services.  The web 
server performs password-based user authentication, group-based access control, 
configurable web server audit logging, web hosting services and SSL protected 
connections.  The Dissemination Application performs redaction based on the 
Dissemination Policy database and the Releasable Items List database; removal of 
revoked or non-releasable documents, i.e. sweeping; webpage management; and 
application specific audit logging.  The crond process oversees the execution of the other 
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administrative tools.  The logrotate daemon is responsible for rotating the audit logs for 
archival purposes.  The webalizer daemon provides the Apache access log in an HTML 
format for viewing and analysis.  The table below summarizes the services implemented 
by each component. 
Web Server • Access Control  
• Audit Logging  
• Authentication 
• SSL Protected Connections 
• Web Hosting  
Dissemination Application • Audit Logging 
• Redaction 
• Sweeping 
• Web Page Management 
Administrative Tools • Analyze Audit Logs  
• Rotate Audit Logs 
• Run daemons 
Table 9. Dissemination System Services Implemented 
The Dissemination System maintains eight databases.  Each database is utilized 
by one or more of the system processes.  The User database contains authentication data 
for registered users of the Dissemination System.  The Releasable Items List database 
specifies the list of releasable material.  The Dissemination Policy database specifies how 
the XML tags are used to control the dissemination of releasable material.  The 
Dissemination System Key database contains the private/public key pair.  The keys are 
1024-bit RSA keys stored in PEM format.  The Dissemination System Certificate 
database contains the X.509 certificate of the Dissemination System that is signed by the 
CISR CA server and stored in PEM format.  The Dissemination Material Repository 
database contains the TCX project material from Configuration Management and the 
generated HTML views.  The Webpage Repository database contains the symbolic links 
to releasable dissemination material and the TCX project and user group homepages.  
The Audit Log Repository database contains the access and error logs generated by the 
Apache Web Server and the Dissemination Application.  The databases are either static 
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(i.e. created during system setup or imported from an external source) or dynamic (i.e. 
created or modified during runtime).  Only read access is allowed for static databases.  
Only processes that need to update a database will have write access to that database.  
The databases and their access modes are summarized in Table 10. 
Database Configuration Accessed By Access Mode
User Static Web Server Read 
Releasable Items List Static DA Read 
Dissemination Policy Static DA Read 
DS Key Static Web Server Read 
DS Certificate Static Web Server Read 
Dissemination Material Repository Dynamic DA Read/Write 
DA Read/Write Webpage Repository Dynamic 
Web Server Read 
DA, Web Server Read/Write Audit Log Repository Dynamic 
Tools Read/Write 
Table 10. Database Mapping 
The system requirements, detailed database descriptions, and process flows are 
described in the high level design specification in the next section. 
C. HIGH LEVEL FUNCTIONAL DESIGN SPECIFICATION 
1. Introduction 
The Dissemination System will be implemented on a server platform running a 
Linux-based operating system that is capable of providing classic UNIX access control 
with elevated administrator privileges. 
An Apache web server will be used to host the Dissemination System web site.  
The web server will implement the following functionality: group-based access control to 
TCX project material, user authentication, web server auditing and management of SSL 
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protected connections between the web server and client machines.  Apache will require 
the client browser to establish SSL connections for access to non-public web content.   
The Dissemination Application is a system process that is responsible for 
preparing the dissemination material for online distribution.  It performs the following 
operations: sweeping the dissemination material repository, redaction, webpage 
management, and application audit. 
These three key components (OS, web server, and DA) form the core of the 
Dissemination System and allow the secure dissemination of the TCX project material.  
Additionally there will be administrative tools and supporting tools on the system which 
will be used to maintain the Dissemination System. 
2. Requirements 
2.1 Dissemination System Requirements 
All of the functional requirements for the Dissemination System, the 
Dissemination Application, the IT Environment and the Dissemination Environment are 
defined in Chapter IV.  The assurance requirements for the Dissemination System and 
Dissemination Application are also included.  The functional requirements are 
collectively fulfilled by the IT Environment, the Apache Web Server, the Dissemination 
Application, the Administrative Tools, the Supporting Tools, and the Dissemination 
Environment.  The following table maps the functional requirements from Chapter IV to 
the system components that implement them.   
A.1 Dissemination System Audit 
A.1.1 Apache Web Server 
A.1.2 Apache Web Server 
A.1.3 Apache Web Server 
A.1.4 Administrative Tool (logrotate) 
A.2 Dissemination System Communication 
A.2.1 Apache Web Server 
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A.3 Dissemination System Cryptography 
A.3.1 Apache Web Server 
A.4 Dissemination System User Data Protection 
A.4.1 Apache Web Server 
A.5 Dissemination System Identification and Authentication 
A.5.1 Apache Web Server 
A.5.2 Apache Web Server 
A.5.3 Apache Web Server 
A.6 Dissemination Application Access 
A.6.1 Apache Web Server 
C.1 Dissemination Application Audit 
C.1.1 Audit Handler 
C.1.2 Audit Handler 
C.1.3 Audit Handler 
C.2 Dissemination Application User Data Protection 
C.2.1 Dissemination Application (Redaction Function) 
C.2.2 Dissemination Application (Sweeping Function) 
C.2.3 Dissemination Application (Webpage Management Function) 
C.2.4 Dissemination Application (Redaction Function) 
E.1 IT Environment Security Management 
E.1.1 IT Environment 
E.1.2 IT Environment 
E.2 IT Environment Access 
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E.2.1 IT Environment 
E.3 IT Environment Data Protection 
E.3.1 IT Environment 
E.3.2 IT Environment 
E.3.3 IT Environment 
E.4 IT Environment Audit 
E.4.1 IT Environment 
E.4.2 IT Environment 
E.5 IT Environment Identification and Authentication 
E.5.1 IT Environment 
F.1 Dissemination Environment Security Management 
F.1.1 Dissemination Environment 
F.2 Dissemination Environment User Data Protection 
F.2.1 Dissemination Environment 
F.3 Dissemination Environment Protection 
F.3.1 Dissemination Environment 
Table 11. Functional Requirements Mapping 
The assurance requirements are collectively met by DS/DA Configuration 
Management, User Guidance documentation, User Access Banners, Administrative 
Guidance documentation, the DS/DA Design Specification, DA Development 
Specification, DA Implementation Representation, DA Vulnerability Assessment Report, 
and DA Life Cycle Management.  The mapping of the assurance requirements to these 
elements is shown in the following table. 
B.1 Dissemination System Configuration Guidance 
B.1.1 DS/DA Configuration Management 
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B.2 Dissemination System Guidance Documents 
B.2.1 User Guidance 
B.2.2 User Guidance & User Access Banners 
B.2.3 Administrative Guidance 
B.2.4 Administrative Guidance 
B.2.5 Administrative Guidance 
B.2.6 Administrative Guidance 
B.3 Dissemination System Testing 
B.3.1 DS/DA Design Specification 
D.1 Dissemination Application Configuration Management 
D.1.1 DS/DA Configuration Management 
D.2 Dissemination Application Operation 
D.2.1 Administrative Guidance 
D.3 Dissemination Application Development 
D.3.1 DS/DA Design Specification 
D.3.2 DS/DA Design Specification 
D.3.3 DA Development Specification, DA Implementation Representation 
D.4 Dissemination Application Guidance Documents 
D.4.1 Administrative Guidance 
D.4.2 Administrative Guidance 
D.4.3 Administrative Guidance 
D.5 Dissemination Application Life Cycle Support 
D.5.1 DA Life Cycle Management 
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D.6 Dissemination Application Testing and Vulnerability Assessment 
D.6.1 DS/DA Design Specification 
D.6.2 User Guidance & Administrative Guidance 
D.6.3 DA Vulnerability Assessment Report 
Table 12. Assurance Requirements Mapping 
This design specification only addresses the functional requirements of the 
Dissemination System and Dissemination Application.  Assurance requirements will be 
addressed as future work. 
2.2 User Requirements 
All users of the Dissemination System must accept the terms and conditions of the 
Dissemination System web site which are promulgated on web page banners.  Access to 
restricted web pages additionally requires that the user must register with the CISR web 
server to obtain a valid username and password and that the user must use a web browser 
configured for SSL with the CISR CA digital certificate installed.  All of these 
procedures are described in the user guidance documentation. 
3. Databases 
The databases are kept in different locations in the file system.  Some of these 
database locations are predefined by the operating system.  These include the DS Key 
database, the DS Certificate database, and the Audit Log Repository database.  Other 
databases are located in the DS Root, Document Root, or Web Root directories.  This file 
structure is illustrated in Figure 4, which also shows the location of the configuration files 
for the system processes and their output files. 
The definitions of the databases include the terms white space and carriage return.  
For this specification white space is an ASCII blank space (a hexadecimal value of 20).  
A carriage return is the UNIX carriage return which consists of an ASCII line feed (a 
hexadecimal value of 0A).  Aside from these characters, only printable characters will be 
used.  
 
Figure 4.   Directory Structure 
3.1 User Database 
The User database contains authentication data used to identify and authenticate 
the user.  The database is a read-only input database.  This distributed database consists 
of two read-only ASCII text files: a Password file and a Group file.  The Password file 
contains a list of entries, with each entry terminated by a carriage return.  Each entry 
contains the following fields:  
• Username – the unique 8-character username of a register user of the 
system 
• Password hash – a 16-byte MD5 checksum of the user password generated 
using an Apache compatible password hash generation tool 
The two fields in the Password file are separated by either a colon or a colon and 
at least one white space.   
The Group file consists of a list of entries with each entry consisting of the 
following fields: 
• Group Name – a valid group name on the system 
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• Group Members – a variable length list containing the names of users 
belonging to the group specified in Group Name.  The user names are 
separated by at least one white space. 
For each entry, the Group Name and Group Members fields are separated by a 
colon and at least one white space.  Each entry is terminated by a carriage return.   
The User database will be imported from the CISR web server and used by the 
Apache web server for access control to different portions of the webpage. 
3.2 Releasable Items List Database 
The Releasable Items List (RIL) database contains a list of all Configuration 
Management items that are releasable at a given time.  The RIL will be used in 
conjunction with the Dissemination Policy database for distribution of project material in 
accordance with the TCX dissemination policy.  It is a read-only input database.  This 
database is an ASCII text file containing a list of entries, with each entry terminated by a 
carriage return.  Each entry contains the following fields: 
• Filename – the full path and filename of the releasable item 
• DDF Filename – the name of the corresponding document descriptor file 
(DDF) 
The two fields must be separated by at least one white space.  The Dissemination 
Application uses this database during sweeping, redaction, and webpage management.  
For the initial implementation, the document descriptor file specifies the file-level access 
control markings for each file in a Configuration Item. 
3.3 Dissemination Policy Database  
The Dissemination Policy database specifies how the TCX access control 
markings (implemented as XML tags in the DDF) are used to control the dissemination 
of releasable material.  It is a read-only input database.  This database is an ASCII text 
file containing a list of entries, with each entry terminated by a carriage return.  Each 
entry contains the following fields separated by at least one white space: 
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• File Type Marking– a printable 32-character ASCII string specifying the 
type of the dissemination material 
• File Sensitivity Marking – a printable 32-character ASCII string 
specifying the distribution sensitivity of the dissemination material.  This 
marking is optional and the character * (an asterisk) specifies that the field 
is not in use 
• Authorized User Groups – a variable length list specifying the user groups 
that are authorized to view material that is marked with the corresponding 
combination of File Type and File Sensitivity markings.  The group names 
are separated by a comma and at least one white space. 
The access control markings currently defined for the initial implementation are 
listed in Table 13 and Table 14. 












Table 14. File Sensitivity Markings 
All releasable items must be labeled with a File Type marking. Only releasable 
items that require special dissemination handling will have a File Sensitivity marking.  
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The Dissemination Policy database is utilized by the Dissemination Application to create 
redacted views and to update the webpage repository. 
3.4 Dissemination System Key Database  
The Dissemination System Key database contains the private/public key pair.  
They are generated locally, i.e., on the Dissemination System, using the OpenSSL tool. 
The keys are 1024-bit RSA keys stored in PEM format in two separate files.  Following 
the Apache convention, the key files are kept together with the Apache configuration 
files.  The private key is encrypted and requires a pass phrase to decrypt before use.  The 
public key is kept as part of the certificate signing request file that is generated along with 
the key pair.  Only the Dissemination System administrator has write access to this 
database.  The keys are used by the Apache web server to establish and maintain SSL 
connections with the clients. 
3.5 Dissemination System Certificate Database  
The Dissemination System Certificate database contains the X.509 certificate of 
the Dissemination System that is signed by the CISR CA server and stored in PEM 
format.  The certificate file is located inside the Apache configuration files folder.  The 
certificate is used by the web server to authenticate itself to the client machine when 
initiating a SSL connection. 
3.6 Dissemination Material Repository Database  
The Dissemination Material Repository database contains the TCX project 
material from Configuration Management and the redacted views.  The Dissemination 
Material Repository is a distributed database made up of the following components: 
• XML documents – all XML documents to be disseminated 
• Non-XML documents – all non-XML documents to be disseminated 
• Document descriptor files – a set of files containing XML access control 
markings for all dissemination material 
• Redacted documents – all redacted XML files and their corresponding 
HTML generated views 
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• Revoked documents – all documents that are swept from the other 
components of the Dissemination Material Repository database 
The XML documents, non-XML documents, and document descriptor files are 
read only files.  They are imported from the Releasing Agent and processed by the 
Dissemination Application to create the Webpage Repository.  The Redacted documents 
component is a dynamic portion of the Dissemination Material Repository database that 
is generated and maintained by the Dissemination Application.     
3.7 Webpage Repository Database 
The Webpage Repository database contains all web viewable content.  The 
Webpage Repository database contains two types of data: 
• Symbolic links – refer to files in the Dissemination Material Repository 
database 
• Homepages – project and group top level web pages 
The symbolic links are generated and maintained by the Dissemination 
Application.  Symbolic links are used instead of the target files for maintenance and 
security reasons.  On the Dissemination System there can exist multiple symbolic links to 
the same target file located in the Dissemination Material Repository database.  Based on 
the target file’s access control markings and the current dissemination policy, the target 
file can be released to multiple user groups.  Hence multiple links must be created in the 
appropriate group directories in the Webpage Repository database.  System maintenance 
becomes easier because content changes to the target file require no changes to the 
associated symbolic links.  The symbolic links provide additional security by disallowing 
web users from accessing the target files directly.  
 Most of the homepage files contain content that is dynamically generated by the 
Dissemination Application; however, from the user’s viewpoint the pages are static.  All 
users of the Dissemination System have read-only access to different parts of the 
webpage repository based on their group authorization.  The entire Webpage Repository 
database is hosted by the Apache web server. 
3.8 Audit Log Repository 
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The Audit Log Repository database contains the web server and Dissemination 
Application audit logs.  The repository contains two types of logs: 
• Error Log – contains error messages generated by either the web server or 
the Dissemination Application 
• Access Log – contains informative messages about accesses to material on 
the web server or operations performed by the Dissemination Application 
that require auditing 
The Audit Log Repository is regularly updated by the web server and the 
Dissemination Application.  The audit logs contain all audit material from the 
Dissemination System based on the current audit policy as specified by the Program 
Manager. 
4. Processes 
4.1 Apache Web Server 
The Apache Web Server is responsible for user authentication, access control, 
audit logging, web hosting, and management of SSL protected connections.   
4.1.1 Input 
The Apache Web Server requires the following input databases:   
• Webpage Repository database – used for web hosting 
• User database – used for authentication and access control 
• DS Key database – used during process startup 
• DS Certificate database – used for SSL protected connections 
4.1.2 Output  
The Apache Web Server logs auditable events to both the Access and Error logs 
contained within the Audit Log Repository database.  This is done by the audit logging 
functionality of the web server:  
• Audit Log Repository database – used for audit logging 
4.1.3 Processing 
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4.1.3.1 Initialization  
Prior to running the web server, the administrator must modify the default Apache 
configuration file to support TCX online distribution.  Specifically, the administrator 
must set the web root directory path, specify access controls for web content, and enable 
SSL.  The web root directory is used to specify the Webpage Repository database used 
for web hosting.  Apache is configured to use the Basic Authentication method to 
authenticate users based on the Password file of the User database.  Apache is also 
configured to use the Group file of the User database to determine group membership of 
users and the directory access control attributes to enforce group-based access controls.  
In order to provide SSL protected communications, Apache must be configured with the 
OpenSSL module installed.  This allows Apache to utilize the OpenSSL library to handle 
HTTPS requests.  Additionally, Apache rewrite rules are used in the Apache 
configuration file to force the use of SSL accesses to non-public proprietary directories 
that require authentication. 
4.1.3.2 Runtime 
During runtime the Apache Web Server is responsible for serving web pages to 
users and protecting non-public material.  For public users the web server acts as a typical 
web server, serving user requests and allowing the user to access non-proprietary 
material.  For registered users the web server additionally establishes SSL connections, 
performs user authentication and access control, and audits user accesses. 
A typical registered user web request is handled as follows: 
1. The web server responds to the user request and provides the project 
homepage from the Webpage Repository database. 
2. If the user selects a proprietary material link, the web server establishes an 
SSL connection with the client machine and initiates the user authentication sequence.  
Upon receiving user authentication data (username and password) the web server verifies 
the authentication data from the Password file of the User database.   
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3. After successful authentication, the web server uses the group-based 
access control information in its configuration file and the group membership data in the 
Group file of the User database to determine if the user is authorized to access the data. 
4. The user is then provided with the group homepage containing links to all 
material which is accessible by that particular group. 
5. User accesses are logged, in addition to web server errors encountered 
during the handling of the user request.  The level of detail captured in the audit logs is 
dependent on the audit level specified in the Apache configuration file. 
A SSL connection must be established prior to authentication in order to provide 
confidentiality protection for the transmission of authentication data and non-public 
dissemination material.  When requested by the client, the web server presents its digital 
certificate stored in the Dissemination System Certificate database to identify itself.  The 
client is not required to authenticate itself to the web server. 
4.2 Dissemination Application  
The Dissemination Application is a system process responsible for sweeping, 
redaction, webpage management, and audit.  These functions are implemented in the 
following modules: Sweeping Handler, Redaction Handler, Webpage Manager, and 
Audit Handler. 
4.2.1 Input 
The Dissemination Application requires the following read-only databases: 
• Releasable Items List database – used by Sweeping Handler, Redaction 
Handler, and Webpage Manager 
• Dissemination Policy database – used by Redaction Handler and Webpage 
Manager 
• Dissemination Material Repository database – used by Sweeping Handler, 
Redaction Handler, and Webpage Manager 
4.2.2 Output 
The Dissemination Application generates or modifies the following databases: 
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• Dissemination Material Repository database – modified by Sweeping 
Handler and Redaction Handler 
• Webpage Repository database – generated or modified by Webpage 
Manager 
• Audit Log Repository database – generated or modified by Sweeping 
Handler and Audit Handler 
4.2.3 Processing 
4.2.3.1 Initialization 
The Dissemination Application is a program that runs in the background as a 
daemon.  The Dissemination Application configuration file specifies the location of all 
input and output databases used by the application.  The Dissemination Application is 
executed by the cron daemon (crond) on a regular basis.  The frequency of execution is 
specified in the crontab file.   
4.2.3.2 Runtime 
4.2.3.2.1 Sweeping Handler 
The Sweeping Handler assures that all items in the XML documents and Non-
XML documents components of the Dissemination Material Repository database are 
specified on the Releasable Items List database.  For items in those components that are 
not on the RIL the Sweeping Handler moves them to the Revoked components of the 
database.  Revocation of files on the Dissemination System is automatically performed 
when a new RIL (without the revoked item on it) is imported and the Dissemination 
Application is run.  The second function of the sweeping module scans the document root 
directory and the web root directory to locate broken symbolic links.  If broken links are 
found, their location is recorded in the Dissemination Application Error Log.  An alarm 
will be generated to notify the system administrator if so configured.  
4.2.3.2.2 Redaction Handler 
The primary function of the Redaction Handler is to generate proper HTML views 
of releasable XML documents based on the access control markings and the current 
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dissemination policy.  For the initial implementation access control markings are applied 
at the file level.  The Redaction Handler performs the following steps for each XML file 
specified in the RIL: 
1. From the DDF file of the XML file, the Redaction Handler locates and 
extracts the access control tags for the XML document. 
2. The Dissemination Policy database is examined to determine the 
Authorized User Groups for the specified pair of access control tags. 
3. The Redaction Handler creates a folder with the same name as the XML 
filename in the Redacted Views component of the Dissemination Material Repository 
database. 
4. The Redaction Handler then creates redacted XML file(s) in that folder 
based on the XML file and the Authorized User Groups.  A redacted XML file will be 
created for each authorized user group.  This file will be named as follows: <original 
name><_><user group name><.xml>, e.g. specification_developers.xml.   
5. Each redacted XML file is then processed through XSL transformations to 
create an HTML generated view with an HTML link to the XML file appended.    
4.2.3.2.3 Webpage Manager 
The Webpage Manager is responsible for managing the Webpage Repository 
database.  Specifically, it creates symbolic links in the Webpage Repository database for 
the HTML generated views and non-XML files, and updates the group homepages to 
reflect the latest group-viewable content.  The Webpage Repository database contains a 
project home folder and a subfolder for each user group.  The symbolic links created by 
the Webpage Manager are stored in the group specific folders.  The HTML generated 
views and non-XML files are located in the Dissemination Material Repository database.  
The HTML generated views are created from the redacted XML documents by the 
Redaction Handler as described above.   
The Webpage Manager performs the following steps for each redacted XML 
document located in the Redacted Views component of the Dissemination Material 
Repository database: 
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1. The Webpage Manager extracts the user group name from the filename of 
the redacted XML document.  The format of the filename is described in the Redaction 
Handler section above. 
2. The Webpage Manager creates a symbolic link to the HTML generated 
views associated with the redacted XML document in the group specific folder of the 
Webpage Repository database.  The symbolic link has the same name as the target file 
(i.e., the HTML generated view). 
The creation of symbolic links for non-XML files is a more extensive process.  
The Webpage Manager performs the following steps for each non-XML file specified in 
the Releasable Items List database: 
1. From the DDF file of the non-XML file, the Webpage Manager locates 
and extracts the access control tags for the file. 
2. The Dissemination Policy database is examined to determine the 
Authorized User Groups for the specified pair of access control tags. 
3. The Webpage Manager creates a symbolic link in the group specific folder 
of the Webpage Repository database with the target being the non-XML file.  The 
symbolic link has the same name as the target file located in the non-XML documents 
component of the Dissemination Material Repository database. 
The second function of the Webpage Manager is to update the group homepages.  
The Homepages component of the Webpage Repository database contains both static and 
dynamic elements.  The TCX project homepage is statically created by the system 
administrator to display links to the different group sections of the TCX Dissemination 
System website.  The group homepages are dynamically generated by the Webpage 
Manager based on the directory content. 
4.2.3.2.4 Audit Handler 
The Audit Handler is responsible for logging all actions performed by the 
Dissemination Application.  Audit logs will be generated in the Common Log Format as 
specified in the Dissemination Application configuration file.  Audit logs are generated 
and stored in the Audit Log Repository database.   
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4.3 Administrative Tools 
4.3.1 crond 
crond is a system daemon that executes scheduled commands.  To do this, it scans 
crontab files, which specify daemons to be run, and runs their commands at the 
appropriate time [13].  For the Dissemination System the crontab files will specify the 
logrotate, webalizer and the Dissemination Application processes to be run on a system 
administrator specified interval. 
4.3.2 logrotate 
logrotate rotates, compresses, and mails system logs on a set interval [14].  The 
daemon allows the administrator to specify how frequently the logs are rotated (daily, 
weekly, or monthly) and how many old rotations to keep on the system.  logrotate 
appends a number to the current log name and creates a new blank current log.  If older 
rotations exist, then those are renamed such that the oldest log name will contain the 
highest number.  For the Dissemination System, logrotate is responsible for rotating the 
Apache log files utilized for auditing of the web server and the log files utilized by the 
Dissemination Application.  The Dissemination System administrator is responsible for 
configuring logrotate in accordance with the specification set forth by the TCX project 
Manager.   
4.3.3 webalizer 
webalizer is a web server log file analysis tool [15].  webalizer creates HTML 
graphical representations of the Apache access log.  The HTML page contains statistics 
and accesses to web page content recorded in the access log.  For the Dissemination 
System, webalizer will be used solely by the system administrator to analyze the access 
audit log for non-proprietary information access on the web server.  Since it runs as a 
daemon the webalizer output will be updated to reflect the most current access log.  If 
desired, the system administrator can run webalizer to obtain the timeliest update. 
5. Supporting Tools 
5.1 OpenSSL 
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The OpenSSL tool provides commands for generating public/private key pairs 
and certificates.  For the Dissemination System the OpenSSL tool will be used to 
generate an RSA public/private key pair for the web server and an X.509 certificate 
signing request.  The public/private key pair is stored in the Dissemination System Key 
database.  The signing request is sent to the CISR CA and the returned signed certificate 
is stored in the Dissemination System Certificate database.   
5.2 linkcheck.pl 
The linkcheck.pl Perl script locates broken symbolic links on a Linux-based 
operating system.  The Dissemination System utilizes this script to assure that the 
dissemination material repository and the webpage repository do not contain broken links 
to target files. 
D. SUMMARY 
An overview of the design specification was first presented.  Following the 
overview, a high level design specification containing the details of the databases, 
processes, and procedures required to implement the Dissemination System was 
provided.  The initial implementation of the Dissemination System based on this 
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VI. INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION 
The TCX Dissemination System initial design was discussed in the previous 
chapter.  This chapter describes the construction of the prototype of this design starting 
with the development and testing environment.  Next, the process used to setup an 
operational prototype system is discussed and includes a description of the manual 
simulation of the Dissemination Application.  A set of test scenarios is presented along 
with their result.  This prototype partially implements the design; the unimplemented 
features are documented.  The final section describes the problems encountered during 
development and their solutions.   
A. DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING ENVIRONMENT 
The prototype Dissemination System (herein referred to as prototype system) was 
implemented on a desktop machine running Fedora Core 3 Linux.  The Apache HTTP 
Server 2.0 software was used as the web server for the system.  For developmental 
testing, the prototype system was configured to respond to the default local computer 
address, i.e., localhost.   
For system testing, the prototype system was connected to the NPS campus 
network and assigned an NPS domain IP address.  With this address, other computers 
within the NPS network were able to connect to the prototype system.  The prototype 
system was disconnected from the NPS network except for selected remote access test 
scenarios.   
Both Linux and Windows client systems were used to conduct the testing.  The 
Linux client test machine was the same system hosting the prototype system.  The 
Windows client test system was a laptop attached to the NPS network.  Testing was done 
using two different operating systems with two different web browsers (Mozilla and 
Internet Explorer) to assure that the access control methods implemented were 
compatible with both systems.  Figure 5 illustrates the test topology. 
 
Figure 5.   Testing Environment 
B. SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION 
The construction of the prototype system consisted of four stages: 
1. File System Customization 
2. Database Generation 
3. Manual Simulation of the Dissemination Application  
4. Web Server Configuration 
The details of each stage are described separately below.   
1. File System Customization 
The directory structure of the Dissemination System must be implemented prior 
to the generation of databases.  Some of the databases are distributed and thus require the 
creation of multiple directories.  Other databases use default operating system folders and 
therefore will not need to have new directories created.  Table 15 describes the directory 
structure, the files contained in each directory, and the mapping of the files to the 
databases.     
Path What it contains Database 
/var/www/ DS Root Folder n/a 
/etc/httpd/ Apache Root Folder n/a 
/var/www/html/ Web Root Folder n/a 
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/var/www/documents/ DS Document Root n/a 
/etc/httpd/conf/ Apache Web Server 
configuration file 
n/a 




/etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.key/ private key DS Key 
/etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.crt/ digital certificate DS Certificate 
/var/www/usage/ webalizer output files n/a 
/var/logs/ error and access logs Audit Log 
Repository 
/var/www/login/ .htpasswd & .groups 
files 
User 










/var/www/documents/revoked/ Files that are swept 










/var/www/documents/html_generated_views/ HTML generated 




documents and links 
to XML originals 
Repository 
/var/www/documents/ril Releasable Items List Releasable Items 
List 




/var/www/html/tcx/ Root homepage (any 
files in the tcx folder, 
including subfolders 































Table 15. Directory Structure 
Appendix A contains the listings of the complete directory structure and the files 
contained in each directory for the prototype system. 
2. Database Generation 
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The definitions of the databases described in this section are provided in Chapter 
VI.  
a. User Database 
The User database consists of two separate hidden files.  The Password 
file is implemented as an Apache-defined .htpasswd file.  The htaccess password 
generator web tool downloaded from KxS Inc. [16] was used to generate the password 
hashes.  Multiple test users with varying group membership were created for the 
prototype system and are defined in the .htpasswd file.  The Group file is implemented as 
.groups and contains only the groups that require access control.  The user groups defined 
for the prototype system are: Administrator, Collaborator, Customer, Developer, 
Evaluator, and NIST/NSA.  The Public group is not specified in the Group file and all 
users belong to the Public group.  The listing of the .groups and the .htpasswd file can be 
found in Appendix A.  
b. Releasable Items List Database 
The Releasable Items List database consists of one file called ril.txt.  For 
this implementation the sample set of releasable items includes XML documents, source 
code, tar archives, and publications.  Only one document descriptor file is used for the 
prototype system; thus for each RIL entry, the same DDF Filename (ddf_CI0001.xml) is 
specified.  The listing of the ril.txt file can be found in Appendix A. 
c. Dissemination Policy Database 
The Dissemination Policy database is contained in the file policy.txt.  The 
content of this file defines the different combinations of File Type and File Sensitivity 
markings used by the prototype system to control access to project material.  The 
dissemination policy enforced by the prototype system is summarized in Table 16.  The 
complete listing of the policy.txt file can be found in Appendix A. 
File Type  File Sensitivity  Authorized User Groups 
Code, Engineering Notes, 
or User Documents 
Engineering Release All user groups except Customer 
and Public 
Verification Evidence  Engineering Release Only Administrator, Developer, 
Evaluator, and NIST/NSA 
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All File Types Proprietary Restricted Only Administrator and 
Developer 
All File Types No Sensitivity Marking 
(denoted as “*”) 
All user groups 
Publications Engineering Release Not released to any groups 
(denoted as “invalid”) 
Table 16. Prototype Dissemination Policy 
d. Key and Certificate Database 
The creation of the Dissemination System public/private key pair and 
certificate signing request was done two different ways.  One method generated a raw 
key and the other generated an encrypted key.  The OpenSSL tool was utilized via the 
CA.pl Perl script to generate all keys and signing requests.  The CA.pl script was pre-
installed with the operating system and provided a user-friendly command line interface 
for the OpenSSL tool. 
Since the CISR CA server does not exist, the CA.pl Perl script was also 
used on the prototype system to simulate the certificate generation and signing functions 
to be performed by the CISR CA.  A self-signed certificate for the CISR CA was first 
created.  The public/private key pair and a certificate signing request were generated 
next.  The OpenSSL tool uses the information in the signing request to generate and sign 
the Dissemination System certificate.  The keys and certificates were created in a 
directory under the root user home directory.  The Dissemination System private key and 
certificate then replaced the default web server private key and certificate in the Apache 
defined key and certificate directories.  Screen captures of the CA certificate and the 
Dissemination System certificate are contained in Appendix B. 
e. Dissemination Material Repository Database 
The Dissemination Material Repository is a distributed database in 
multiple folders.  To create the Dissemination Material Repository multiple test files 
were imported into the system.  These test files were XML documents, non-XML 
material (e.g. publications and code), HTML files, and document descriptor files.  Since 
the Dissemination Application is not yet implemented, HTML generated views of XML 
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files were manually generated and imported.  The XML and non-XML documents are the 
files that are disseminated online.  The access control markings for the web accessible 
documents of the prototype system are listed in Table 17.  These markings were used in 
the document descriptor file (ddf_CI0001.xml) which is located in Appendix A. 
File Name File Type File Sensitivity Marking 
05paper_tcx.pdf Publications *  (no sensitivity marking) 




thesis-jclark.pdf Publications Proprietary Restricted 
xweb-tangle.py.xweb Code Engineering Release 
xhtml-review.xsl Code Proprietary Restricted 
Table 17. Initial Implementation Test Documents 
For all the test files, the XML access control tags were located in the same 
document descriptor file.  Only a subset of the possible tag combinations was used for the 
initial implementation.   
The following steps were done manually to simulate the Dissemination 
Application function that creates redacted XML files and their corresponding HTML 
files.  A folder named Documentation_Standards_xml was created in the 
html_generated_views folder of the repository.  Then a set of redacted XML files was 
created in the new folder, one file per authorized user group.  The authorized user group 
name was appended to the filename of the redacted XML file for that particular group.  
According to the dissemination policy described in Table 16 and the access control tags 
in the test document descriptor file all non-public groups were allowed access to the test 








An HTML file was also created for each redacted XML file with the same 
file name except for the file extension.  The HTML file contains the XML contents 
formatted with XSL transformations and an HTML link to the associated redacted XML 







A screen capture of the Documentation_Standards_nist_nsa.html 
document can be found in Appendix B.  The HTML link to the redacted XML file is 
shown at the end of the HTML view. 
f. Webpage Repository Database 
The Webpage Repository database consists of all web accessible content.  
The Dissemination System homepage (index.html) contains HTML links to the different 
group sections of the website.  Inside each group section is a group homepage (another 
index.html file) and a set of symbolic links to the following files in the Dissemination 
Material Repository: redacted XML files and their corresponding HTML files, and 
original non-XML target files.   
The group homepages contain HTML links to the symbolic links in the 
directory.  The creation of the symbolic links is to be performed by the Webpage 
Manager component of the Dissemination Application, but for the prototype system they 
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were created manually.  Based on the dissemination policy and the access control tags for 
the non-XML test documents in the document descriptor file, symbolic links pointing to 
the original non-XML target file were created manually in each group folder.  Symbolic 
links were also created for every redacted XML and HTML file in the 
html_generated_views folder in the appropriate group folder of the Webpage Repository.   
For instance in the collaborator folder in the Webpage Repository 






All of the files created there are symbolic links except index.html.  A 
complete listing of the files for each group directory can be found in Appendix A in the 
directory structure listing. 
g. Audit Log Repository Database 
The Apache Web Server has built in logging capability.  For the prototype 
system, the default configuration settings for the Apache audit function were not 





• ssl_ request_log 
The default configuration for Apache is “LogLevel warn”.  This logs all 
emergency, alert, critical, error, and warning conditions [6].  Different log formats are 
used by the Apache Web Server as the default log format including the Common Log 
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Format and the Combined Log Format.  The log path specified in the configuration file 
was /var/httpd/log/. 
3. Manual Simulation of the Dissemination Application 
The Dissemination Application program will be implemented as future work.  For 
the prototype all functionality of the Dissemination Application was manually 
implemented and the processes used to accomplish this task are described in the 
following sections. 
a. Sweeping Handler 
The Sweeping Handler is intended to transfer all non-releasable items in 
the Dissemination Material Repository database into a separate directory for analysis by 
the system administrator.  This function was simulated by comparing the files in the 
XML_original folder and the non-XML_original folders with the ril.txt file.  Any files 
that were not specified in ril.txt were moved into the revoked folder.  The linkcheck.pl 
Perl script was also run to find broken symbolic links.  The script was run from the 
command line and used the –a flag to find all links in the Dissemination System Root 
folder.  Broken links were then repaired or deleted. 
b. Redaction Handler 
The Redaction Handler is intended to redact the original XML files and 
generate the proper HTML views of the redacted XML documents.  The manual 
implementation of this function was discussed previously in the Dissemination Material 
Repository database generation section. 
c. Webpage Manager 
The Webpage Manager is intended to create symbolic links to files in the 
Dissemination Material Repository database and updates the group homepages to reflect 
the current content.  The manual implementation of this process was discussed in the 
Webpage Repository database generation section. 
d. Audit Handler 
The Audit Handler functions were not implemented in the prototype 
system. 
4. Apache Web Server Configuration 
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The Apache Web Server came preloaded within the Fedora Core 3 operating 
system.  Additionally, the mod_ssl add-on module was already installed and running on 
the web server, so no setup of the SSL configuration was necessary to allow HTTPS 
connections.  Since the system could already operate as a standard web server, it only 
needed to be configured to host the TCX dissemination website.  To do so, modifications 
were made to the Apache configuration file, which can be found in Appendix A.  The 
website root folder was changed to the TCX Webpage Repository root, 
/var/www/html/tcx/.   
Custom directory definitions were added into the Apache configuration file to 
specify the Webpage Repository directories that required authentication and access 
control.  Apache supports two directory-based user authentication methods, Basic and 
Digest. Both methods allow the use of a user name and password for authentication, 
however, the Digest method is more secure because it only sends password information 
to the clients in encrypted form. Since the Digest method is not supported by older 
browsers, most web servers use the Basic method to be compatible with a wide range of 
browsers.  The prototype system also uses the Basic method since the threat of sending a 
password in the clear to clients is mitigated by the use of the SSL.  For the prototype, 
Basic Authentication was used in conjunction with group-based access control.  The 
group-based access control mechanism allows specific groups to access directories for 
which they are authorized. 
Additionally, some of the Webpage Repository directories needed to be forced to 
require SSL connections.  To do this, a number of Apache RewriteRule directives were 
needed and implemented.  The Apache rewrite engine provides support for runtime URL 
manipulation and is used by the prototype system to configure specific directories to 
always require an SSL connection.   
5. Administrative and Supporting Tools 
a. crond 
For the initial implementation the default crond configuration file was not 
modified.  The default configuration runs the logrotate and webalizer daemons on a 
regular schedule as specified by the configuration files for those daemons. 
b. logrotate 
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For the initial implementation the pre-install logrotate configuration file 
was not modified.  The default rotation frequency was set to once a week and the number 
of archived logs to be maintained was set to four. 
c. webalizer 
webalizer runs as a daily cron job on the Dissemination System.  It reads 
the Apache access log and creates HTML output files with graphs and statistics of use.  
For the initial implementation, only the Apache access log is processed by webalizer.  
Since the Apache access log only contains audit data for HTTP requests, the webalizer 
output does not include a report on HTTPS requests.  Because of this limitation, the 
review and analysis of audit data for HTTPS requests contained in the Apache SSL logs 
must be performed manually. 
d. OpenSSL 
The OpenSSL tool is used to generate the private/public key pair and the 
certificate signing request as discussed previously in the Key and Certificate database 
generation sections.  The normal mode of operation is to generate a signing request and 
send the request to the certificate authority for signing.  For the prototype system, the 
Dissemination System acted as the certificate authority and the signing was performed 
locally. 
e. linkcheck.pl 
The linkcheck.pl Perl script is run manually during the simulation of the 
Sweeping Handler.  The manual running of this tool does not provide the audit logging 
functionality as defined in the design specification.  The linkcheck.pl script was obtained 
from http://www.orlandokuntao.com/mf_linkcheck.html [17].  Its source can be found in 
Appendix A. 
C. TESTING 
Three types of functional tests are required for the Dissemination System: Web 
Server Testing, Dissemination Application Testing, and Tool Testing.  The 
Dissemination Application Testing was not performed. 
1. Web Server Functional Testing 
Three test scenarios were conducted to verify the following functions of the web 
server 
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• User authentication 
• Group-based access control 
• HTTPS connections for non-public web content 
Both the Mozilla web browser running on the Linux Dissemination System and 
the Microsoft Internet Explorer browser running on a Windows laptop computer were 
used for testing. 
User authentication was verified by logging in as different users and requesting 
access to both public and non-public web content.  All non-public content required 
authentication with a username and password before the information is served.  The login 
prompt appeared when attempts to access non-public content were made.  Access was 
granted to authorized users who logged in with a correct username and password 
combination.  Negative tests were also conducted to verify that access is denied to 
unauthorized users by entering incorrect usernames and passwords. 
Group-based access control was tested by setting up multiple users with different 
group memberships.  Based on the user’s group membership, the user was only 
authorized to view material cleared for that particular group in accordance with the 
dissemination policy.  Screen captures of the developer group and collaborator group’s 
available content can be found in Appendix B. 
HTTPS connections were tested by requesting a normal HTTP connection to non-
public web pages.  It was observed that the web address in the location bar of the web 
browser was automatically changed from “http://...” to “https://...”.  Additionally, user 
manipulation of the browser’s address location to circumvent SSL protection was also 
tested to verify that once an HTTPS connection is established, the user cannot reload the 
same protected webpage without using HTTPS.  These two tests confirmed that the 
Apache rewrite directive worked as expected.   
2. Tool Testing 
The logrotate, webalizer, and linkcheck.pl tools were tested locally on the Linux 
Dissemination System. 
90 
logrotate was verified to be operating correctly through continual use of the 
system.  Audit data was colleted over multiple weeks.  After each week, all five audit 
logs on the system were rotated.  The logs were renamed with “_x” appended to their 
name where “x” ranges from 1 to 4 as defined by the logrotate configuration file.  New 
empty audit logs were then created.  Daily and hourly rotations were also tested.    
The webalizer default setting was to update the output HTML files daily.  At the 
end of each month, a month long HTML log analysis file was created.  Testing involved 
viewing the HTML output files and assuring that the contents reflected the Apache access 
log.  A screen capture from the webalizer output can be found in Appendix B. 
The linkcheck.pl script was downloaded and tested prior to incorporating it into 
the manual simulation of the Dissemination Application.  A test directory structure with 
symbolic links and target files was created.  The script was run and found no broken 
links.  Then a target file was removed and the script was run again.  The script reported 
that the symbolic link pointing to the removed target file was broken. 
D. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
Two problems involving the limitations on file and terminal device access 
imposed by the default SELinux policy were encountered.  SELinux is automatically 
enabled in the default installation of Fedora Core 3 Linux.  SELinux provides additional 
security functions to protect the underlying operating system if the Apache server is 
compromised.  
The default SELinx policy disables daemons from communicating with the 
controlling console [18].  Since Apache’s private key is encrypted, the passphrase must 
be entered when Apache is started at the controlling console.  To start Apache, the 
SELinux policy had to be modified to allow Apache to access the console.  After Apache 
was successfully started, the SELinux policy was reverted to the default policy.  The 
modified SELinux policy file is included in Appendix A. 
SELinux also enforces additional access controls on the file system.  SELinux 
will not allow web users to access files without the correct security attribute defined for 
Apache.  Apache will not be able to host files that it does not have authorization to 
access.  This was encountered when files generated locally on the machine but outside of 
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the Dissemination System Root directory were manually copied into the Dissemination 
System Root directory.  The copied file did not have the correct security attributes for 
Apache to access.  After the attribute was properly set, Apache was able to host the 
contents. 
E. SUMMARY 
The development and testing environment was first presented for the prototype 
system.  The construction of the prototype was then described including the manual 
simulation of the Dissemination Application.  Test scenarios, unimplemented functional 
design features, and challenges encountered were discussed.  The next chapter contains 
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VII. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces potential future work and presents the final conclusions 
on the research and development of the TCX Dissemination System.  The design 
specification presented here is for the initial implementation of the Dissemination 
System, therefore there is potentially room for improvement.  Several features discussed 
in the requirements analysis (Chapters III and IV) were not implemented and are 
discussed below along with additional suggestions for improving the design. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
As previously discussed, a manual simulation of the Dissemination Application 
was implemented in the Dissemination System initial implementation.  Future work 
should include a complete implementation of the Dissemination Application as specified 
in the functional design specification.  This includes the creation of a Dissemination 
Application program that fully implements the four primary modules: Sweeping Handler, 
Redaction Handler, Webpage Manager, and Audit Handler.  A programmatic 
Dissemination Application will allow automatic dissemination of project material once it 
is imported onto the Dissemination System.   
In addition to creating the Dissemination Application program, the development 
of the operational Dissemination Environment should also be completed (detailed in 
Chapter III) to fulfill the project goal of open dissemination.  While some parts of the 
environment have been developed for the TCX project, a number of security-relevant 
mechanisms such as the Releasing Agent, CISR Certificate Authority, and TCX user 
registration still need to be implemented.  With the existence of the fully operational 
Dissemination Environment, open and seamless online dissemination of TCX project 
material can easily be accomplished. 
While subsequent implementations of the Dissemination Application will include 
additional audit capabilities, the audit analysis functionality in the initial implementation 
is incomplete.  The initial implementation utilizes the webalizer analysis tool in the 
default configuration that does not process the SSL audit logs created by Apache.  The 
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audit logs contain both valid accesses and illegal attempts to access public and non-public 
material.  However, to provide complete analysis of the logs, follow-on work would need 
to be developed to customize the webalizer configuration to support detailed audit 
analysis of HTTPS accesses. 
To assure the correct design and implementation of the Dissemination System, the 
next iteration of development should reassess the initial set of requirements and 
implement a development environment that applies the security assurance requirements 
as described in Chapter IV.  These assurance requirements were not addressed by the 
functional design specification and initial implementation that was completed for this 
thesis.  As part of the implementation of the assurance requirements, thorough functional 
testing and vulnerability analysis of the system should be conducted.  This would result 
in a more robust Dissemination System. 
The initial implementation of the Dissemination System did not utilize the 
functionality and benefits of XML to the extent that it could have.  Future work on the 
Dissemination System should use XML to enforce finer grained document control.  The 
granularity for document release of the initial implementation was at the document level; 
the expanded use of XML in future implementations could afford paragraph-level 
releases of documents to different user groups.  Marking XML documents for paragraph-
level release would not require much additional effort, however, the Redaction Handler 
of the Dissemination Application would require enhancement.  Future fine grained 
document control would require the Redaction Handler to be capable of generating 
multiple different redacted views for each user group.  The redacted views would be from 
the same source XML document but could potentially contain different sets of paragraphs 
from that document. 
Although a discussion of document and file signatures was included in Chapter III 
as a dissemination objective of the TCX project, this initial implementation of the 
Dissemination System used test documents that did not contain integrity signatures.  
Future work should include the implementation of signed dissemination material and the 
external distribution of the signature verification tool.  For finer grained document 
release, digital signatures should be implemented on the smallest releasable portion of a 
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file.  This will result in a single file containing multiple signatures within it, but the use of 
XML rather than other word processed documents will make the implementation more 
practicable.   
C. CONCLUSION 
After analyzing existing web-based dissemination systems for open source 
projects it was determined that the TCX Dissemination System should be developed from 
the ground up to achieve the open dissemination requirements of the TCX project.  The 
concept of operation for an XML-centric web-based dissemination environment was 
created to map all interactions and data flow among different components that make up 
the Dissemination System.  Development of the requirements was preceded by an 
analysis of the assumptions, threats, policies, and security objectives for the 
Dissemination System.  This development framework was based on the Common Criteria 
methodology, but was not rigorously followed because of the non-evaluatability of the 
system.  The requirements included both security functional and security assurance 
requirements for the Dissemination System.  These requirements were addressed in the 
functional design specification for the initial implementation.  The Dissemination System 
consists of three classes of system processes running on a Linux-based operating system: 
web server, Dissemination Application, and administrative tools.  The web server 
implements group-based access control, user authentication, and secure communication.  
The Dissemination Application is a program that automates the redaction and preparation 
of releasable materials for dissemination.  Future designs will utilize this design 
specification as a backbone.  The Dissemination System design specification is the 
blueprint for the initial implementation prototype.  
A useable dissemination prototype was created that satisfies a subset of the TCX 
dissemination requirements.  The problems encountered, and their solutions, provided 
insight into what future developers might encounter when configuring a dissemination 
system on a Linux-based machine.  The prototype also generated future work for 
subsequent developments. 
The next design iteration should include a complete implementation of the 
Dissemination Environment which will allow seamless dissemination of TCX project 
material.  Additional future work will ensure that all dissemination requirements for the 
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TCX project are achieved and an example of high assurance development will be 




APPENDIX A – FILE LISTINGS OF PROTOTYPE SYSTEM  
A. Introduction 









• apache.te (SELinux Apache policy) 
Changes made to the files presented here relative to those of the existing 
prototype system are for formatting reasons only.  Portions of httpd.conf and apache.te 
contain no changes and were removed for readability purposes.  These two files are 
marked accordingly.  
 
B. Directory Structure 
 This directory structure includes all directories containing database material 
relevant to the Dissemination System.  Additionally it contains directories and files 
associated with the configuration of the system.  Lines ending with a “:” denote that the 
lines following it are contained within that directory.  Lines ending with a “/” denote a 





















































































































































































































































































The following listing shows the content of the .groups file which is part of the 
User database. 
# ************************************************************************** 
# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# .groups - created by D. Rob Kane on 2005 05 25 
# This file contains the group names and members of the groups 
# ************************************************************************** 
 
administrator: drkane irvine 
collaborator: drkane irvine 
customer: drkane tdnguyen 
developer: drkane tdnguyen 
evaluator: drkane jclark 








# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# .htpasswd - created by D. Rob Kane on 2005 05 25 












The following listing shows the content of the ril.txt file, which is the Releasable 
Items List database. 
# ************************************************************************** 
# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# ril_v1.0 - created by D. Rob Kane on 2005 05 25 
# The following file is the Releasable Items List Database used specify 




/XML_original/Documentation_Standards.xml   ddf_CI0001.xml 
/non-XML_original/thesis-jclark.pdf    ddf_CI0001.xml 
/non-XML_original/xhtml-review.xsl    ddf_CI0001.xml 
/non-XML_original/xweb-tangle.py.xweb   ddf_CI0001.xml 




The following listing shows the content of the policy.txt file which is the 
Dissemination Policy database.  This listing was changed for formatting purposes. 
# ************************************************************************** 
# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# policy.txt - created by D. Rob Kane on 2005 05 25 
# The following file is the policy database.  The first column lists  
# all possible access tags available.  The second column contains the  
# groups that have access to those tags. 
# ************************************************************************** 
 
CODE ENGINEERING RELEASE administrator, collaborator, 
developer, evaluator, 
nist_nsa 
ENGINEERING NOTES ENGINEERING RELEASE administrator, collaborator, 
developer, evaluator, 
nist_nsa 
PUBLICATIONS ENGINEERING RELEASE  invalid 




USER DOCUMENTS ENGINEERING RELEASE administrator, collaborator, 
developer, evaluator, 
nist_nsa 
VERIFICATION EVIDENCE ENGINEERING RELEASE administrator, developer, 
evaluator, nist_nsa 
 
CODE PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED    administrator, developer 
ENGINEERING NOTES PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED administrator, developer 
PUBLICATIONS PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED  administrator, developer 
SPECIFICATIONS PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED administrator, developer 
USER DOCUMENTS PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED administrator, developer 
VERIFICATION EVIDENCE PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED administrator, 
developer 
 
CODE * administrator, collaborator, customer, 
developer, evaluator, nist_nsa, public 
ENGINEERING NOTES * administrator, collaborator, customer, 
developer, evaluator, nist_nsa, public 
PUBLICATIONS * administrator, collaborator, customer, 
developer, evaluator, nist_nsa, public 
SPECIFICATIONS * administrator, collaborator, customer, 
developer, evaluator, nist_nsa, public 
USER DOCUMENTS * administrator, collaborator, customer, 
developer, evaluator, nist_nsa, public 
VERIFICATION EVIDENCE * administrator, collaborator, customer, 




The following listing shows the content of the ddf_CI0001.xml file, which is the 
document descriptor file for the initial implementation of the Dissemination System. 
<controls xmlns= 
"tag:tcx.cisr.nps.navy.mil,2005-05-02:dissemination_labeling" 
      xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> 
  <resource xlink:href="DIE-XXE-docbook_2005-04-25.zip"> 
    <label>CODE</label> 
 
    <label>PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED</label> 
  </resource> 
 
  <resource xlink:href="Documentation_Standards.html"> 
    <label>ENGINEERING NOTES</label> 
 
    <label>ENGINEERING RELEASE</label> 
  </resource> 
 
  <resource xlink:href="Documentation_Standards.xml"> 
    <label>ENGINEERING NOTES</label> 
 
    <label>ENGINEERING RELEASE</label> 
  </resource> 
 
  <resource xlink:href="thesis-jclark.pdf"> 
    <label>PUBLICATIONS</label> 
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    <label>PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED</label> 
  </resource> 
 
  <resource xlink:href="xweb-tangle.py.xweb"> 
    <label>CODE</label> 
 
    <label>ENGINEERING RELEASE</label> 
  </resource> 
 
  <resource xlink:href="xhtml-review.xsl"> 
    <label>CODE</label> 
 
    <label>PROPRIETARY RESTRICTED</label> 
  </resource> 
   
  <resource xlink:href="05paper_tcx.pdf"> 
    <label>PUBLICATIONS</label> 
 
    <label></label> 
  </resource> 





The following listing shows the content of the httpd.conf file, which is the Apache 
configuration file.  The headers at the beginning of the file contain comments describing 
the changes made to the document.  Comment blocks were added throughout the file to 
document TCX-specific modifications.  Portions of this document were not changed and 
were removed for readability.   
# 
# Based upon the NCSA server configuration files originally by Rob McCool. 
# 
# This is the main Apache server configuration file.  It contains the 
# configuration directives that give the server its instructions. 
# See <URL:http://httpd.apache.org/docs-2.0/> for detailed information about 
# the directives. 
# 
# Do NOT simply read the instructions in here without understanding 
# what they do.  They're here only as hints or reminders.  If you are unsure 
# consult the online docs. You have been warned.   
# 
# The configuration directives are grouped into three basic sections: 
#  1. Directives that control the operation of the Apache server process as a 
#     whole (the 'global environment'). 
#  2. Directives that define the parameters of the 'main' or 'default' server, 
#     which responds to requests that aren't handled by a virtual host. 
#     These directives also provide default values for the settings 
#     of all virtual hosts. 
#  3. Settings for virtual hosts, which allow Web requests to be sent to 
#     different IP addresses or hostnames and have them handled by the 
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NO CHANGES – REMOVED FOR READABILITY 
#     same Apache server process. 
# 
# Configuration and logfile names: If the filenames you specify for many 
# of the server's control files begin with "/" (or "drive:/" for Win32), the 
# server will use that explicit path.  If the filenames do *not* begin 
# with "/", the value of ServerRoot is prepended -- so "logs/foo.log" 
# with ServerRoot set to "/etc/httpd" will be interpreted by the 
# server as "/etc/httpd/logs/foo.log". 
# 
# *************************************************************************** 
# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# Created by D. Rob Kane on 2005 05 25 
# Modifications: 
#  1.  Rewrite rules for SSL in DocumentRoot directory 
#  2.  Changed DocumentRoot 
#  3.  Setup access controls for directories within DocumentRoot 
# *************************************************************************** 
 
### Section 1: Global Environment 
# 
# The directives in this section affect the overall operation of Apache, 
# such as the number of concurrent requests it can handle or where it 











### Section 2: 'Main' server configuration 
# 
# The directives in this section set up the values used by the 'main' 
# server, which responds to any requests that aren't handled by a 
# <VirtualHost> definition.  These values also provide defaults for 









# DocumentRoot: The directory out of which you will serve your 
# documents. By default, all requests are taken from this directory, but 
# symbolic links and aliases may be used to point to other locations. 
# ************************************************************************** 
# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 







# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# The following rewrite rules assure that https is used for the six  
# directories listed below. 
# ************************************************************************** 
RewriteEngine on 
RewriteCond    %{SERVER_PORT} !^443$ 
RewriteRule ^/administrator(.*)$ https://localhost/administrator$1 [L,R] 
RewriteRule ^/collaborator(.*)$ https://localhost/collaborator$1 [L,R] 
RewriteRule ^/customer(.*)$ https://localhost/customer$1 [L,R] 
RewriteRule ^/developer(.*)$ https://localhost/developer$1 [L,R] 
RewriteRule ^/evaluator(.*)$ https://localhost/evaluator$1 [L,R] 
RewriteRule ^/nist_nsa(.*)$ https://localhost/nist_nsa$1 [L,R] 
 
# 
# Each directory to which Apache has access can be configured with respect 
# to which services and features are allowed and/or disabled in that 
# directory (and its subdirectories).  
# 
# First, we configure the "default" to be a very restrictive set of  
# features.   
# 
<Directory /> 
    Options FollowSymLinks 




# Note that from this point forward you must specifically allow 
# particular features to be enabled - so if something's not working as 





# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# The DocumentRoot was changed to the TCX folder 
# ************************************************************************** 





# Possible values for the Options directive are "None", "All", 
# or any combination of: 
#   Indexes Includes FollowSymLinks SymLinksifOwnerMatch ExecCGI MultiViews 
# 
# Note that "MultiViews" must be named *explicitly* --- "Options All" 
# doesn't give it to you. 
# 
# The Options directive is both complicated and important.  Please see 
# http://httpd.apache.org/docs-2.0/mod/core.html#options 
# for more information. 
# 




# AllowOverride controls what directives may be placed in .htaccess files. 
# It can be "All", "None", or any combination of the keywords: 
#   Options FileInfo AuthConfig Limit 
# 
    AllowOverride All 
 
# 
# Controls who can get stuff from this server. 
# 
    Order allow,deny 
    Allow from all 




# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# The following sections specify the access control based on group affiliation. 
# This uses the Apache basic authentication with group based control. 
# ************************************************************************** 
<Directory "/var/www/html/tcx/administrator"> 
  AuthUserFile /var/www/login/.htpasswd 
  AuthGroupFile /var/www/login/.groups 
  AuthName "Administrator" 
  AuthType Basic 




  AuthUserFile /var/www/login/.htpasswd 
  AuthGroupFile /var/www/login/.groups 
  AuthName "Collaborator" 
  AuthType Basic 




  AuthUserFile /var/www/login/.htpasswd 
  AuthGroupFile /var/www/login/.groups 
  AuthName "Customer" 
  AuthType Basic 




  AuthUserFile /var/www/login/.htpasswd 
  AuthGroupFile /var/www/login/.groups 
  AuthName "Developer" 
  AuthType Basic 




  AuthUserFile /var/www/login/.htpasswd 
  AuthGroupFile /var/www/login/.groups 
  AuthName "Evaluator" 
  AuthType Basic 
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  AuthUserFile /var/www/login/.htpasswd 
  AuthGroupFile /var/www/login/.groups 
  AuthName "NIST/NSA" 
  AuthType Basic 




# UserDir: The name of the directory that is appended onto a user's home 
# directory if a ~user request is received. 
# 
# The path to the end user account 'public_html' directory must be 
# accessible to the webserver userid.  This usually means that ~userid 
# must have permissions of 711, ~userid/public_html must have permissions 
# of 755, and documents contained therein must be world-readable. 












I. linkcheck.pl  
linkcheck.pl is the Perl script used by the Dissemination System to remove broken 
symbolic links.  Because it was downloaded from the Internet, the complete script is 
contained in this appendix. 
#!/usr/bin/perl -w 
# 
# SccsId[] = "@(#)linkcheck.pl 1.3 01/08/03 (Link check Perl program)" 
# 
#----------------------------------------------------------------------# 
#                            linkcheck.pl                              # 
# -------------------------------------------------------------------- # 
#                                                                      # 
#   Copyright (c) 2002-2003 by Bob Orlando.  All rights reserved.      # 
#                                                                      # 
#   Permission to use, copy, modify and distribute this software       # 
#   and its documentation for any purpose and without fee is hereby    # 
#   granted, provided that the above copyright notice appear in all    # 
#   copies, and that both the copyright notice and this permission     # 
#   notice appear in supporting documentation, and that the name of    # 
#   Bob Orlando not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining     # 
#   to distribution of the software without specific, written prior    # 
#   permission.  Bob Orlando makes no representations about the        # 
110 
#   suitability of this software for any purpose.  It is provided      # 
#   "as is" without express or implied warranty.                       # 
#                                                                      # 
#   BOB ORLANDO DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS           # 
#   SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY      # 
#   AND FITNESS.  IN NO EVENT SHALL BOB ORLANDO BE LIABLE FOR ANY      # 
#   SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES          # 
#   WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER    # 
#   IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION,     # 
#   ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF     # 
#   THIS SOFTWARE.                                                     # 
#                                                                      # 
# -------------------------------------------------------------------- # 
#        Program documentation and notes located at the bottom.        # 
#----------------------------------------------------------------------# 
 
   BEGIN { $diagnostics::PRETTY = 1 } 
 
   $SIG{'INT'}=sub {print "\nExiting on $SIG{'INT'}\n";exit $SIG{'INT'}}; 
 
   use File::Find; 
   use Getopt::Std; 
   use Cwd; 
   use POSIX qw(uname); 
   my $host =  (uname)[1]; 
   $| = 1; # Autoflush (unbuffer output) 
 
   use vars qw($opt_a $opt_H $opt_h $opt_l $opt_r $opt_v); 
   my $options='aHhlrv'; 
   exit_usage("Invalid option!\n") unless (getopts($options)); 
   show_documentation() if ($opt_H); # Full documentation 
   exit_usage()         if ($opt_h); # or usage brief. 
   exit_usage("Filesystem required.\n") if ($#ARGV < 0); 
 
   if ($opt_v) 
   { 
      use diagnostics; 
   } 
 
 #---------------------------------------------------------# 
 # Eliminate all but local filesystem searches right away. # 
 #---------------------------------------------------------# 
   my $local_fs; 
   my @search; 
   foreach (@ARGV) 
   { 
      if ($local_fs = `df -lk $_`) 
      { 
         push(@search, $_); 
      } 
      else 
      { 
         print "File system $_ must be local to $host, not NFS mounted.", 
               "\nSkipping $_.\n"; 
         $_ = ""; 
      } 




 # Ignore find command's stderr output (eliminates "Permission # 
 # denied" and most--not ALL--other bothersome messages).      # 
 #-------------------------------------------------------------# 
   open(OLDERR, ">&STDERR"); 
   open(STDERR, ">/dev/null") or die "Can't redirect stderr: $!"; 
 
   my $q = 0; # Found counter 
   my $r = 0; # Removed counter 
   find sub # [Anonymous] subroutine reference (called a coderef). 
   { 
      return unless -l "$_"; # Skip all but links. 
 
    #----------------------------------------------------------# 
    # Skip nfs mounted links, and /proc and /cdrom pathnames.  # 
    #----------------------------------------------------------# 
      return if ( 
                   (lstat("$_"))[0] < 0 
                || 
                   $File::Find::name =~ /\/proc/s 
                || 
                   $File::Find::name =~ /\/cdrom/s 
                ); 
 
    #----------------------------------------------------------# 
    # Skip link if it's not on a local filesystem as well.     # 
    #----------------------------------------------------------# 
      my $dir = cwd; 
      return unless ($local_fs = `df -lk $dir`); 
 
      $! = 0; # Clear error message variable 
      return unless defined(my $target = readlink("$_")); 
 
      my $error  = "$!"; 
         $error  = "($error)" if (defined($error) && $error ne ""); 
 
      my $ls_out = ($opt_l) 
        ? `ls -albd $File::Find::name 2> /dev/null` 
        : "$File::Find::name -> $target"; 
 
      chomp($ls_out); 
 
      unless (-e "$target") # Unless the link is OK, do the following. 
      { 
         $q++; 
         print "Broken link: $ls_out $error\n"; 
         if ($opt_r) 
         { 
            print  "rm '$File::Find::name'\n"; 
            if (unlink("$File::Find::name") == 0) # Zero = none deleted. 
            { 
               print "Unable to remove $File::Find::name!\n"; 
               return; 
            } 
            $r++; 
            print "Removed '$File::Find::name'\n" if ($opt_v); 
112 
         } 
         return; 
      } 
 
    #----------------------------------------------------------# 
    # Return unless user requests list of all links (-a).      # 
    #----------------------------------------------------------# 
      return unless ($opt_a); 
 
      if    (-f "$target") { print "Linked file: $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      elsif (-d "$target") { print "Linked dir:  $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      elsif (-l "$target") { print "Linked link: $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      elsif (-p "$target") { print "Linked pipe: $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      elsif (-S "$target") { print "Linked sock: $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      elsif (-b "$target") { print "Linked dev:  $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      elsif (-c "$target") { print "Linked char: $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      elsif (-t "$target") { print "Linked tty:  $ls_out $error\n"; } 
      else                 { print "Linked ???:  $ls_out $error\n"; } 
 
      $error = ""; 
      return; 
   }, @search; # find sub 
 
 #-------------------------------------------------------------# 
 # Restore stderr.                                             # 
 #-------------------------------------------------------------# 
   close(STDERR) or die "Can't close STDERR: $!"; 
   open( STDERR, ">&OLDERR") or die "Can't restore stderr: $!"; 
   close(OLDERR) or die "Can't close OLDERR: $!"; 
 
   print "$host: Found $q broken links.  Removed $r.\n"; 




#             S U B R O U T I N E S  /  F U N C T I O N S              # 
#                       (in alphabetical order)                        # 
#----------------------------------------------------------------------# 
sub exit_usage # Exits with non-zero status.                           # 
               # Global vars:   $main::notify                          # 
               #                $main::support                         # 
#----------------------------------------------------------------------# 
{ 
   my $fn_name = "exit_usage"; 
   my $txt     ; 
 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------# 
 # Assign to private variable, $notify either $main::support or  # 
 # $main::notify (takes $main::support over $main::notify).      # 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------# 
   my $notify; 
   if (defined($ENV{LOGNAME} )) { $notify = $ENV{LOGNAME}; } 
   else                         { $notify = $ENV{USER};    } 
 
   $txt =  "Usage:   $0 -$options fs ...\n"; 
   $txt =  "$_[0]\n$txt" if ($#_ >= 0); # Prefix message arguments 
   $txt .= "\n         -a = Display All links." 
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        .  "\n         -H = Displays full documentation." 
        .  "\n         -h = Gives usage brief." 
        .  "\n         -l = Long list (e.g. 'ls -al')." 
        .  "\n         -r = Remove broken links (use with caution)." 
        .  "\n         -v = Verbose output." 
        .  "\n         fs = Required filesystem for search." 
        .  "\n              (multiple filesystems may be specified)\n" 
        .  "\nPurpose: Search filesystem (descending directories) for" 
        .  "\n         broken links, optionally displaying all links" 
        .  "\n         (-a) and/or removing (-r) them.\n"; 
 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------# 
 # If running interactively, then give'm usage, else notify      # 
 # program support person(s) because a cron'd job called usage.  # 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------# 
   print "$txt"; 
 
   exit 1; 
} # sub exit_usage 
 
#----------------------------------------------------------------------# 
sub show_documentation # Display program documentation at bottom.      # 
#----------------------------------------------------------------------# 
{ 
   my $n = 0; 
   foreach (my @doc_lines = <main::DATA>) 
   { 
      print "$_"; 
   } 
   exit $n; 
} # sub show_documentation 
 
 
__END__ # Documentation section follows: 
#======================================================================# 
#                      D O C U M E N T A T I O N                       # 
#======================================================================# 
#                                                                      # 
#      Author: Bob Orlando                                             # 
#                                                                      # 
#        Date: April 29, 2002                                          # 
#                                                                      # 
#  Program ID: linkcheck.pl                                            # 
#                                                                      # 
#     Purpose: Search local filesystem or systems                      # 
#              (descending directories) for broken                     # 
#              links, optionally displaying all links                  # 
#              (-a) and/or removing (-r) them.                         # 
#                                                                      # 
#       Usage: linkcheck.pl -aHhlrv fs ...                             # 
#                           -a = Display All links.                    # 
#                           -H = Detailed documentation.               # 
#                           -h = Usage brief.                          # 
#                           -l = Long list (e.g. 'ls -al').            # 
#                           -r = Remove broken links                   # 
#                                (use with caution).                   # 
#                           -v = Verbose output.                       # 
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#                           fs = Required filesystem for search        # 
#                                (multiple filesystems may be          # 
#                                specified)                            # 
#                                                                      # 
#    Examples: linkcheck.pl /        # Lists broken links (short list) # 
#              linkcheck.pl -l /     # Lists broken links (long list)  # 
#              linkcheck.pl -a /home # Lists all links in /home.       # 
#              linkcheck.pl -r /usr  # Removes broken links from /usr. # 
#                                                                      # 
#     Returns: Zero on success.                                        # 
#              Nonzero in failure.                                     # 
#                                                                      # 
#       Files: ....................................................    # 
#              ....................................................    # 
#                                                                      # 
#       Notes: ....................................................    # 
#              ....................................................    # 
#                                                                      # 
#    Modified: 2003-01-08 Bob Orlando                                  # 
#                v1.3   * Force autoflush (unbuffer output).           # 
#                                                                      # 
#              2002-06-14 Bob Orlando                                  # 
#                v1.2   * Add tally of links found and removed.        # 
#                       * Add host name to messages.                   # 
#                       * Initialize counters $q and $r to 0;          # 
#                                                                      # 
#              2002-06-04 Bob Orlando                                  # 
#                v1.1   * Initial SCCS release.                        # 





The apache.te file contains the security policy for SELinux as modified for the 
TCX Dissemination System.  The headers at the beginning of the file contain comments 
describing the changes made to the document.  Portions of this document were not 
changed and were removed for readability. 
# 




# Policy file for running the Apache web server 
# 
# NOTES:  
#  This policy will work with SUEXEC enabled as part of the Apache 
#  configuration. However, the user CGI scripts will run under the 
#  system_u:system_r:httpd_$1_script_t domain where $1 is the domain of the 
#  of the creating user. 
# 
#  The user CGI scripts must be labeled with the httpd_$1_script_exec_t 
#  type, and the directory containing the scripts should also be labeled 
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#  with these types. This policy allows user_r role to perform that  
#  relabeling. If it is desired that only sysadm_r should be able to relabel 




# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# apache.te - modified by D. Rob Kane on 2005 05 25 
# Modifications: 
#  1.  Allow httpd to access tty and pty devices 
# ************************************************************************** 
type http_port_t, port_type, reserved_port_type; 
 
bool httpd_unified false; 
 
# Allow httpd cgi support 
bool httpd_enable_cgi false; 
 
# Allow httpd to read home directories 
bool httpd_enable_homedirs false; 
 
# Run SSI execs in system CGI script domain. 











# When the admin starts the server, the server wants to acess 
# the TTY or PTY associated with the session. The httpd appears 
# to run correctly without this permission, so the permission 
# are dontaudited here.  
################################################## 
dontaudit httpd_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
 
# ************************************************************************** 
# TCX Project Dissemination System Prototype 
# Allow httpd to access tty and pty devices 
# ************************************************************************** 
allow httpd_t { admin_tty_type }:chr_file { getattr ioctl read write }; 
 
allow httpd_t krb5_conf_t:file { getattr read }; 
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APPENDIX B -- SCREEN CAPTURES OF PROTOTYPE SYSTEM 
A. Introduction 
The following screen captures are included in this appendix: 
• CISR CA certificate 
• Dissemination System certificate 
• Documentation_Standards.html 
• Developer web content 
• Collaborator web content 
• webalizer output 
B. CISR CA Certificate 
 The following screen capture is the test CISR CA digital certificate 
created for the prototype system: 
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C. Dissemination System Certificate 
 The following screen capture is the test Dissemination System digital 




The following screen capture shows an excerpt of a test HTML generated view 




E. Developer Web Content 
The following screen capture shows the test dissemination material available to 
the developer group on the Dissemination System: 
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F. Collaborator Web Content 
The following screen capture shows the test dissemination material available to 




G. webalizer Output 
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